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The past came to visit again last night, 
wrapped her arms round my neck 
and whispered: It’s me. Don’t forget. 
 
I knocked at a door which a woman opened. 
She said in Turkish: Come in. Welcome. 
Hoş geldiniz. Hoş geldiniz. 
 
She handed an album of photos of me, 
my husband, our children, this house, 
pre-1974. The blue album. My living room. 
 
I kept these for you, she said. 
I thanked her in Greek. Efcharisto poli. 
A tiny space the size of a pinhead 
 
between each word stung the air, the moment, 
the dream. She offered coffee and sweets. 
One of us was guest, the other hostess- but which? 
 
Oh, there are some dreams which make no sense. 
Turn over the cup, she said. I will tell you 
your fortune, and we will learn the future. 
 
Yes, I said, yes. We leant like two friends over a secret 
and the patterns of the future on the walls of the cup, 
made us weep on each other’s shoulders 
 
all those thirty year old tears, finally, belatedly; 
two sisters who were mothers, wives, daughters, 
so long ago. Then the past came and sat between us 
 
and woke me with a whisper: 
It’s me. Don’t forget. 
 
“Don’t Forget” by Nora Nadjarian in Hanne (2004) 
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Introduction 
 
Partition leaves a mark.  It may not be visible, but it is always there.  I noticed it 
when I was twelve and traveled to the north of Cyprus for the first time.  In the passenger 
seat next to my father sat his first wife, Katia.  For me, this was a day trip to visit 
monasteries.  For them, it was a return to the family land they had lost when Turkish 
troops landed on the island in 1974.  That day, the reality of partition struck me forcefully 
as I began comparing the north and south.  Geographically, they were part of the same 
island.  Culturally, economically, and politically, they could not have been more 
different.  The north, governed by Turkish Cypriot authorities, was significantly less 
developed than the south.  It had smaller buildings and more open spaces; for the most 
part, it was rural.  The south, in contrast, had streets crowded with cars and trucks, tourist 
areas targeting English and Russian visitors.  That day, though, what interested me the 
most were not these physical variations.  Rather, it was the surprising emergence of 
bitterness in Katia, as she struggled to reconcile the north of 1974 with the north of 2004.  
She was emotional, equally entranced and repelled by the state of her old home.  My 
father, who has not lived in Cyprus since 1956, was comparatively relaxed and 
optimistic.  Katia’s resentment shocked me, and I tried to figure out why I had not 
noticed it earlier.  Partition had left its mark and I hadn’t even noticed. 
Cyprus, a tiny idyllic island in the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean, has 
been partitioned for forty years.  Yet, current political dialogues addressing violence in 
the region tend to neglect this country and its division.  It is difficult to determine 
whether the geographical or political size of the island has caused this disappearance, for 
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it was not always this way.  Over the centuries, Venetians, Egyptians, Ottomans, and 
British forces conquered the island.  They each claimed it for strategic purposes: 
Cyprus’s location makes it a perfect steppingstone between the Middle East and Europe.  
After Britain lost India in 1947, its reliance on Cyprus grew: the island acted as a bridge 
between the regions, and ensured the British continued access to oil.  For many centuries, 
two ethnic groups comprised a majority of the island’s inhabitants.  By 1960, Turkish 
Cypriots accounted for a little less than twenty percent of the population, and Greek 
Cypriots represented the other approximately eighty percent.  As a result of the anti-
colonial movement of the 1950s, Greek Cypriots began agitating for union with Greece 
(enosis) while Turkish Cypriots started pushing for partition between Greece and Turkey 
(taksim).  In 1960, both movements failed when the United Kingdom granted Cyprus its 
independence.  Yet, from the start, the new country had difficulty exercising its 
sovereignty.  Greek and Turkish nationalists in Cyprus spent the next fourteen years 
agitating their respective populations.  Their efforts would ultimately bring an end to the 
power-sharing agreement set up by Cyprus’s first constitution.  
For Greece and Turkey – almost seven hundred miles away and forty miles away, 
respectively – Cyprus’s demographics in 1960 provided substantial proof that they were 
responsible for the welfare of their ethnic brothers and sisters on the island.1  After 
independence, in large part because of Greek and Turkish efforts, Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots maintained their ethnic identities, and failed to become simply Cypriot.  
The detrimental effects of this dichotomy emerged in December 1963 (Kanli Noel).  That 
month, the Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios (1913-1977) published a list of 
                                                
1 Greece defended Greek Cypriots because the island was ethnically Greek; Turkey 
defended Turkish Cypriots because, as the minority, they needed protection. 
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thirteen amendments to the constitution.2  Turkish Cypriots panicked.  To them, these 
changes represented yet another attempt on the part of the majority Greek population to 
restrict Turkish rights and opportunities.  A few days before Christmas, inter communal 
violence broke out in the capital city of Nicosia.  To this day, Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
dispute the initial source of disagreement.  Following the violence, Turkish Cypriots 
moved into enclaves, which Greek Cypriots quickly blockaded.  Within a month, the 
power-sharing community envisaged by the 1960 constitution had fallen apart.  Each 
group grew increasingly distinct from the other, both politically and physically.  The next 
decade was a tense standoff between communal, neighboring, and international leaders.  
Turkish Cypriots periodically returned to their enclaves, Greek Cypriots ruled the 
government unilaterally, and the United Nations (UN) stepped in as peacemaker.  In July 
1974, well-known enosis hit man Nikos Sampson (1935-2001) led a coup against 
President Makarios.  The Archbishop fled, but lived, and the coup lasted for only a 
handful of days before Turkish troops retaliated by invading the island.  It quickly 
became apparent to the American government that the colonels in Greece’s military 
government had sponsored Sampson’s enosis venture.  Cyprus’s constitution included a 
clause allowing for Turkish, Greek, or English intervention in Cypriot affairs should the 
status quo be disrupted.  Turkey’s first invasion of July 20, then, was legal.3  However, 
on August 14, it commenced a second invasion that completely violated Cypriot law.  
Turkish forces pushed south until they occupied approximately thirty-seven percent of 
the country.  The UN brokered ceasefires in both July and August 1974, but a massive 
                                                
2 Makarios served as Cyprus’s first president from 1960 until 1977. 
3 Over the past decade Turkey’s periodic threats to invade Cyprus coincided with Greek 
actions against the Turkish Cypriots.  The United States led frantic negotiations that 
prevented full-out war until 1974. 
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population displacement occurred as Turks moved north and Greeks south.  To this day, 
the UN’s border remains in effect, and runs the width of the island.  Over the past forty 
years, periodic communal talks have broken down over various issues, and plans for 
reconciliation have failed at the political level.  As Cypriot division has largely vanished 
from global political dialogues, Cypriots such as Katia continue to live with the daily 
realities of partition. 
In the following thesis I will revisit the issue of Cyprus’s split by looking at it 
alongside division in Ireland.  My research examines each state at three points on its path 
to partition: before, during, and after.  I argue both partitions resulted from international 
interference (before), that they both led to massive migrations (during), and that British 
policies encouraged division along ethnic and religious lines (after).  Traditionally, 
academics view Cypriot division as the product of two factors: competing nationalisms 
and foreign involvement.  They frequently overlook the serious impact that massive 
displacement and physical division have on communities in the years that follow.  I argue 
that these deserve to be treated as importantly as the larger political and economic 
concerns, and that diplomats must realize how slowly partitioned communities forget.  
All too often politicians suggest partitioning a state currently undergoing violence or civil 
war.  Cyprus’s experience is worthy enough to lead a discussion on why this needs to 
end.  The country has been in the news lately for its economic troubles, and the 
implications of its recent trials spread far beyond its borders.  As a member of the 
European Union (EU) it has a certain level of influence in European politics.  However, it 
has also historically enjoyed partnerships with Russia, Syria, and Lebanon.  It has yet to 
take full advantage of its position as the geographical and cultural middle ground 
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between these two regions.  If Cyprus resolves its partition – either by a two-state 
agreement or some alternative – it can focus on connecting the cultures to its east and 
west.   
In the traditional academic literature, partition is an absurd policy.  Foreign 
powers implement it in an attempt to secure their regional interests, often to the detriment 
of local populations.  Radha Kumar, an expert on ethnic conflicts, suggests that external 
forces, particularly colonial powers, offer partition as part of their “divide and quit” 
policy; this ensures that they can extract themselves quickly from the violence.  She 
criticizes this method and points out that the argument for partition (it will circumvent 
future conflict) is inherently flawed.  No division based on ethnicity has ever been 
reversed.  Both Kumar and sociologist Robert Schaeffer treat Cypriot partition alongside 
their discussions on division in Ireland, India, and Palestine.  All four countries have split 
along ethnic or religious lines, rather than political ones.  However, the Cyprus case, 
conflict specialist James Ker-Lindsay points out, is unique.  Cold War ideologies 
influenced its domestic politics before partition, when President Makarios decided to take 
the non-aligned path in his dealings with Soviet and American governments.  In the end, 
though, the country’s split along ethnic lines offers some insight into the strengths of 
nationalist ideologies.  Academics like Michael Attalides and Halil Ibrahim Salih have 
emphasized the role of Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus’s partition.  Cyprus’s 
unusual position – as the site of both an ethnically driven division and Cold War politics 
– makes it an interesting case study of partition.   
In Cyprus, memories of the initial division remain vivid to those who experienced 
it.  Yet, the traditional literature avoids these recollections in favor of a highly rational 
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analysis of competing nationalisms or external interference.  Moreover, analyses of the 
Cyprus problem arrive highly politicized.  Greek Cypriot authors discuss the partition in 
clear-cut terms, while Turkish Cypriots tend to be more emotional and nationalistic.  
Both sides claim to be the victim.  More importantly, no text views the two regions in 
Cyprus as part of the same state.  The traditional Greek narrative views the northern 
territory, but neither its people nor its culture, as legal property of the Republic.  Turkish 
Cypriots, meanwhile, view the island as divided between two equally lawful states.  Texts 
that diverge from the traditional framework are rare, but their number has grown 
substantially over the past ten years.  Christalla Yakinthou, a political scientist, concludes 
that the 1960 constitution’s power-sharing provisions, not competing nationalisms, 
prevented island-wide unity.  Anthropologist Rebecca Bryant’s interviews with Turkish 
Cypriots allow us access to the forty-year old memories of an emotional and turbulent 
period.  As the Turkish invasion grows ever more remote, it becomes increasingly 
important to collect and report these personal memories of Cypriot partition.  Working 
off of interviews by Bryant and her colleague Olga Demetriou I have compiled both the 
rational and emotional aspects of Cypriot partition.  The result is an anthropological and 
historical view of a frozen conflict that is just as much personal as it is political. 
This project approaches partition from a new angle.  Instead of solely focusing on 
one aspect of partition, I look at three: international interference, mass displacement, and 
the type of division.  Instead of considering only one or a handful of communities, I focus 
on how two very different partitioned regions interact with these aspects, and each other.  
By contrasting these two communities (although focusing primarily on Cyprus), I argue 
that the effects of partition in each are relatively identical.  Partition as a policy never 
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truly changes the landscape, and it never actually resolves inter communal tensions.  In 
my research I worked with texts from a variety of fields: historical, sociological, and 
anthropological.  I explored the archives of two Irish newspapers, the Irish Times and 
Irish Independent, in an effort to understand how their reporters viewed Cypriot 
independence, violence, and partition.  I accessed declassified government documents at 
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor and the UN Archives in New York.  
The Ford Library offers insight into American reactions to Turkey’s invasion and 
occupation; documents from the UN detail the organization’s commitment to maintaining 
peace on Cyprus.  Both provide an extraordinary glimpse into the backroom politics that 
characterize the Cyprus conflict.  Unfortunately, the diplomatic language of each 
prevents a complete understanding of what motivated foreign powers to get involved in 
Cyprus.  Despite this, though, documents from the Ford Library help support my claims 
about American interests in Cyprus, and reports from UN officials in Cyprus help 
characterize the situation on the ground.   
Telling the story of Cypriot partition can be highly problematic.  Not only does 
the terminology remain highly charged – “invasion” for Greeks, “intervention” for Turks 
– but the statistics vary.  Despite the conflict’s absence from many political agendas, it 
remains a controversial topic for historians.  To remedy some of the misconceptions, I 
will be in conversation with three works in particular as they highlight the rationales and 
trauma behind partition.  Robert Schaeffer’s book Warpaths forms the theoretical 
foundation.  He addresses why policymakers might resort to partition so often.  It can, 
they argue, create a homogeneous society, avert a civil war, satisfy independence 
movements, and secure superpower interests in the region.  However, Schaeffer also 
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points out the policy’s limitations through brief case studies of Ireland, the Vietnams, the 
Koreas, Cyprus, Pakistan/India/Bangladesh, and Palestine/Israel.  It is, Schaeffer argues, 
impossible to create a homogeneous society.  Moreover, in any state, minorities will be 
disenfranchised and poorly treated, and other international powers will not always accept 
a new state’s sovereignty.  The risk for conflict with neighboring states, he argues, 
increases substantially following partition.  Others agree with Schaeffer’s general claims, 
but some disagree with his specifics.  Douglas Little, a historian, feels that long-term 
disagreements between Greeks and Turks had a greater impact on Cyprus’s partition than 
did big power politics.  Moreover, he suggests that partitions themselves are not the 
reasons that many divided countries remain troublesome today.  Despite these issues, 
three of Schaeffer’s observations about the nature of partition form the backbone of each 
chapter: big power politics (Chapter One), mass displacement (Chapter Two), and ethnic 
and political division (Chapter Three).  His work offers a comprehensive view of the 
similarities between partitioned countries and, in doing so, highlights the absurdity of 
continuing to use partition as a peacemaker.  
To grapple with the emotional impact of partition that Schaeffer and other authors 
like Yakinthou and Kumar ignore, I introduce Rebecca Bryant’s ethnographic study with 
displaced Turkish Cypriots.  Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and 
Military Strife allows us unprecedented access to the experiences of Turkish Cypriots 
displaced between 1955 and 1974.  Bryant’s colleague, Olga Demetriou, conducted a 
similar study with Greek Cypriots displaced during the 1974 war.  The two works differ 
dramatically as a result of their subjects.  Rebecca Bryant’s findings paint a difficult 
picture of Turkish Cypriots’ experiences as a marginalized community in the enclaves 
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from 1963-1974.  Demetriou’s work, meanwhile, describes a Greek Cypriot population 
largely oblivious to the trials of Turkish Cypriots during that period.  Each emphasizes 
the profound sense of loss that both communities experienced as a result of Turkey’s 
invasions.  When discussing partition, it is tempting to clearly demarcate right and wrong, 
good and bad.  Demetriou and Bryant clearly illustrate that, at least for Cyprus, there is 
no such clarity.  Their interviews add life to the field of partition research, for they force 
readers to think beyond politics.  
Ireland’s partition appears in this project as a supplement to that in Cyprus: I 
explore what this other frozen conflict can tell us about Cypriot division and partition in 
general.  Frank Delaney’s novel Ireland helped me do this.  It is, admittedly, an unusual 
selection, but I would argue that fiction is the best vehicle to understanding something as 
complex and difficult as partition.  By creating a microcosm of the real world, novels are 
capable of making a big problem comprehensible, manageable, and perhaps even 
solvable.  Delaney traces the journeys of an Irish storyteller as he roams about the island, 
mixing myths and history to villagers in the 1960s.  The Storyteller makes the past 
accessible and recognizable in part because his characters are driven by the same forces 
that drive his listeners: curiosity, love, duty, and artistry.  Through his words, the past 
comes alive.  The Statutes of Kilkenny, the arrival of the English, the Easter Rising; they 
are all almost mythical tales that the Storyteller makes tangible.  Delaney himself is a 
powerful and entrancing narrator, capable of illustrating the turbulence and majesty of 
centuries of Irish history through his short stories.  In Ireland, he muses, the past exists 
with the present.  His passionate and respectful portrayal of Irish partition is, in many 
ways, a fictionalized version of the ethnographies by Demetriou and Bryant.  Like them, 
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Delaney successfully makes Irish partition a very personal matter.  Although I do not use 
the novel as an historical source, I do use it as an emotional one.  In the midst of 
researching forgotten partitions like Ireland and Cyprus, Delaney’s work is a powerful 
reminder that partitioned communities forget slowly.  
The “Cyprus problem” is a general term, one that only alludes at the murky 
situation on the idyllic Mediterranean island.  In reality, it encompasses a host of issues in 
desperate need of resolution.  Partition sundered the country in two and a great deal of 
blame continues to circulate because of it.  Katia’s reaction when we visited the North is 
simply one example; the fact that many Greek Cypriots refer to the north as the 
“occupied territories,” and not the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” is another.  It 
is easy to understand why the Cyprus problem has largely been forgotten.  But, at a time 
when inter communal violence threatens to tear some regions apart, Cyprus needs to be 
brought to the forefront of the discussion.  It must serve as a warning for what happens 
when states are partitioned.  More than that, it must serve as an example of what 
resolution can look like. 
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Chapter 1: The Role of International Interference 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with developing a model for partition, every 
divided community does, in fact, share the same basic characteristics.  Partition is, at its 
heart, a local matter.  One of the commonalities we see in the twentieth century’s major 
divisions, though, is a great deal of international interference.4  From Ireland to Korea to 
Cyprus, foreign powers intruded and manipulated.  Their publicly proclaimed reasons for 
doing so ranged from preventing a future war (post-1945 Germany) to ending a current 
one (1990s Bosnia).  This trend continues today amidst mentions of partition in Syria.  
The United States, Russia, and others attempt to legitimize their presence at peace talks 
by suggesting they primarily intend to end sectarian strife.5  Realistically, though, these 
great powers involve themselves in such politically complex situations to secure national 
interests in the region.  Foreign powers that have intervened in Cyprus and Ireland clearly 
display this split between public rhetoric (“humanitarian interference”) and underlying 
geopolitical motivations.  In this section, therefore, I explore the history of foreign 
interference in Ireland and Cyprus.  While the particulars vary – for instance, England 
colonized Cyprus but not Ireland – the overall effects display significant similarities.  
Foreign involvement in partitions has historically required a great deal of delicacy 
on the part of external powers.  Publicly, officials represent such interference as an act of 
benevolence towards the country in question; privately, they take advantage of the local 
                                                
4 Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1990), 7. 
5 Jamie Tarabay, “In Syria talks, don’t mention the P-word,” Al Jazeera America, January 
23, 2014, accessed January 23, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/22/in-
syria-talks-donatmentiontheaypaword.html. 
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political chaos inherent in partitioned communities.  Colonial relationships differ slightly 
in that they are less duplicitous, but the end results are the same.  In Ireland, the nature of 
foreign interference was not explicitly colonial.  However, British authorities treated the 
island in much the same way they did Cyprus, several centuries later.  Over the past five 
hundred years, Ireland has been an English colony in all but name.  This ambiguity has 
resulted in a thorny relationship that vacillates between the oppression and cultivation of 
Irish culture, economy, and society.  In pre-independent Cyprus, Ottoman (1571-1878) 
and British (1878-1960) rulers unabashedly manipulated the local culture and economy, 
as well.  In the years following Cyprus’s independence in 1960, though, duplicitous 
foreign agendas evolved, and began to complicate the new state’s sovereignty.  As during 
the colonial era, external actors’ own policy goals motivated their involvement, though 
they now claimed to be motivated by humanitarian interests.  In the end, the geo-political 
goals of other states severely undercut local autonomy and encouraged partition.  
Although colonialism (as in Cyprus) and direct foreign interference (as in Ireland) share 
many similarities, they differ a great deal in attitudes towards the local populations.  
Nevertheless, as will be shown below, both Cyprus and Ireland bear the marks of decades 
of schizophrenic and overbearing policies on the part of outside powers.6  The 
ramifications of such behavior take decades to fully appear, but in the end they always 
stunt local autonomy and cultivate regional bitterness. 
Over the past century, the nature of international interference has changed with 
the founding of the United Nations (UN) and other similar developments in international 
law.  The UN seeks to build, through arbitration, global consensus.  It claims, therefore, 
                                                
6 Franz L. Neumann, “Soviet Policy in Germany,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 263 (May 1949): 165, accessed March 28, 2014. 
  13 
to possess a certain objectivity that individual states simply cannot retain.  Moreover, it 
has historically attempted to provide divided states with alternate paths towards peace.  
The UN’s structure ideally inhibits it from intervening solely to further a member state’s 
national interests.  Decisions to interfere must be made by the Security Council, 
comprised of fifteen geographically, economically, and culturally distinct states.  
However, the veto power held by the Council’s five permanent members means that 
opportunities do exist for a particular member state or its allies to drive the UN’s 
operations.  Moreover, the organization’s charter prohibits it from becoming involved in 
domestic matters, which explains why the UN has sent a peacekeeping force to Cyprus 
but not Ireland.7  (Northern Ireland is considered a part of the United Kingdom, and a UN 
peacekeeping force would violate this principle.)  However, Irish troops have participated 
in UN peacekeeping forces, most notably for our purposes to Cyprus.  On one hand, the 
organization’s involvement in the Cyprus problem represents a successful interference: 
there has been no outright war on the island since 1974.  Yet, the persistent existence of a 
foreign body in Cyprus serves as a visible reminder that the opposing sides have not yet 
reconciled.  As Ireland and Cyprus demonstrate all too clearly, foreign interference in 
domestic affairs – whether through colonial, nationalistic, or humanitarian efforts – has 
detrimental effects. 
Ireland 
The English never colonized Ireland.  Yet, English policies restricted Irish 
autonomy and stifled Irish nationalism in much the same way a colonizer would behave 
                                                
7 Istvan Pogany, “Could the UN Keep the Peace in Northern Ireland?,” The World Today 
37 (July-August 1981): 293, accessed March 4, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395493 
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to the colonized.  Foreign interference by this would-be colonial power lacked the 
absolute control of the English in Cyprus, but it was equally damaging.  Since the 1171 
Norman invasion under Henry II (1133-1189), national self-interest has driven English 
policy in Ireland, with little regard to what happens to the island’s Irish inhabitants.  In 
Cyprus, as we will see below, England appeared alternatively as a friend and foe, its 
motives frequently hidden under the guise of solidarity.  No such uncertainty existed in 
Ireland.  For nearly a millennium, the English ruled with overwhelmingly oppressive 
policies that simultaneously favored Protestants over Catholics and suppressed local 
autonomy.  The two countries have been caught up in conflict for so long, and their 
histories have grown so entwined, that it has become difficult to discuss foreign 
interference in the traditional matter.  Particularly in times of war, external interference is 
typically a short and concerted effort to maximize control over a specific piece of 
territory.  Yet the English have dabbled in Ireland for centuries, sometimes vigorously 
and sometimes halfheartedly.  They never formally colonized, but they refused to retreat.  
This ambiguity makes it difficult to understand how much English policy has influenced 
Irish economy, culture, and everyday life.8   
With the Tudor monarchs, English policy in Ireland reached a turning point, and 
took on a distinctly colonial appearance.  After Henry VIII (1491-1547) broke with the 
Catholic Church, he introduced Protestantism to Ireland.  He even went so far as to settle 
Protestants on the island, hoping that this would push the Catholic majority into 
submission.9  Over the next four centuries, England’s grip on Ireland’s population grew 
                                                
88 T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin, editors, The Course of Irish History (Cork: Mercier 
Press, 2011), 122. 
9 Ibid., 164. 
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through its manipulation of these well-placed Protestant communities.  Though many 
newly converted Irish Protestants chafed against the colonial ambitions of the English 
monarch, they recognized their precariousness as a religious minority, and willingly 
submitted to foreign rule.10  The Act of Union, signed in 1801, legally bound together 
England and Ireland, and shifted the sectarian balance in Ireland.  The Irish Protestant 
minority now constituted part of the region’s religious majority, whereas the previous 
Catholic majority in Ireland represented now the religious minority.  Though Ireland 
remained legally its own country, heavy English control stifled surges of nationalism that 
threatened to break apart the union, and call into question English authority in regions 
across the globe. 
The “Time of Troubles” – a euphemism for the Anglo-Irish war between 1919 
and 1921 – ended the 120-year old union.  But, as the predominantly unionist northern 
provinces chose to remain under English rule, Ireland split in two.  The post-war border 
became a serious point of contention, and for the next seventy years, Ireland essentially 
remained at war with England.11  In many ways, this new chapter of conflict devastated 
Irish communities more than the preceding centuries of English rule.  It divided families 
and pitted neighbors against one another in a bitter conflict that was as much about 
politics as it was about religion.  Continued foreign interference restricted and stifled the 
very peace efforts they meant to institute, in the process revealing just how much damage 
the English had done. 
Only in the 1990s did peace in Ireland become a more pronounced goal for the 
English and Irish governments, as well as the international community.  Both English and 
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Irish officials expressed their desire for a resolution: the conflict had gone on for too 
long, and had perpetuated a culture of religious discrimination and economic instability 
in Northern Ireland.  American president Bill Clinton even dispatched former senator 
George Mitchell in 1995 to Ireland to help negotiate a settlement.  Mitchell reported back 
his shock at first seeing a “Peace Line,” which separated Belfast’s Protestant and Catholic 
communities.12  Standing thirty feet tall, and topped with barbed wire at parts, he noted 
the irony of the construct’s name.  Since the 1921 agreement, Northern Ireland had 
struggled to recuperate from centuries of foreign rule.  The English had cultivated a 
culture of separation in which Protestants and Catholics viewed each other with mistrust 
and misgivings long before partition.  Northern Ireland combined the two groups into one 
state, and the preexisting political and religious rifts soon became a serious hurdle to 
lasting peace.  In many ways, then, Ireland has been partitioned twice: between the north 
and south, and between Protestants and Catholics in the north.  The stark religious 
division exemplified by the Peace Line suggests the difficulties of this, and the murkiness 
that resulted from centuries of external interference in Ireland. 
Foreign and Irish leaderships produced the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, their 
latest effort to negotiate a settlement between Ireland’s warring sections.  The Agreement 
covered a range of issues, including self-determination, equality, and the establishment of 
a North-South council.13  Yet, it could not undo the effects of partition quite so easily.  
For most of Ireland’s history, England has been the sole intervening power, and religion 
the primary divisor.  Though never a colony, the English behaved as they did elsewhere 
in their empire, and restricted development of local autonomy.  Unlike in Cyprus, though, 
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the British attempted to merge the two populations, to convert Irish Catholics to 
Protestantism.  Their overwhelming failure to do so reflects England’s larger failure to 
successfully dominate Ireland.  In general, it may be said that other foreign powers have, 
historically, stayed out of the Anglo-Irish relationship.  Until the twentieth century, this 
can be attributed to the geographical proximity of the two islands, as well as England’s 
position as the global power.  Following the Second World War, though, the Cold War 
divided the world into two opposing poles; control over Ireland simply became less 
important.  This does not mean, though, that the situation is any less precarious or 
delicate than that in Cyprus,.  Partition still rendered Ireland in two, and the effects of 
British influence persist.   
Cyprus 
In the past 2,000 years, the entire island of Cyprus has enjoyed sovereignty only 
once, between 1960 and 1974.  As a result, scholars such as Christopher Hitchens have 
argued that Cyprus has a “history of subordination.”14  Its strategic placement – as a 
steppingstone between the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe – has long ensured its 
importance in Mediterranean politics, and its oil reserves continue to make the island 
(and its surrounding waters) a desirable piece of real estate.  This section traces the 
history of foreign interference on the island starting with Ottoman conquest in the 
sixteenth century and ending with Turkey’s invasion in 1974.  This long legacy of 
colonial rule and foreign interference in the island’s domestic politics shaped the specific 
features of Cyprus’s partition.  Ottoman rule forged ethnic divisions, and British 
colonization cemented them.  Both empires oversaw the rise of nationalist movements, 
which encouraged future interferences by non-colonial powers such as Greece, the 
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Republic of Turkey, and the UN.15  In effect, it is possible to reconstruct pre-1974 
Cypriot history simply by recounting the actions of foreign actors.   
Turkey 
In its attempts to justify its 1974 interference, the Turkish government reaches 
back to 1571, when Ottoman Muslims first settled on Cyprus.16  Officials in the 1970s 
claimed that the descendants of this settled population deserved protection from the 
Greek Cypriot majority, which had settled on Cyprus long before the Ottomans.  Ottoman 
policy dictated that the new residents retain the practices and organizational structures of 
the empire, rather than integrate into the Greek population.  Moreover, the sultan allowed 
Greek Cypriots to develop their own institutions, such as the Greek Orthodox Church.  
As Ottoman subjects, Turkish Cypriots technically did not require similar communal 
structures.  This bound them to a far-away ruler and culture, and prevented them from 
breaking away from the Ottoman fold.  Such a separation of ethno-religious groups was 
to be expected under Ottoman rule, which organized society around the millet system.  
Christian communities governed their own internal affairs, but paid a special head tax 
(the jizya) to Ottoman authorities.  This administrative division perpetuated communal 
division.  In the long run, both delayed the maturation of Turkish Cypriot leadership, and 
accelerated Greek Cypriots’ sense of autonomy.  Quite simply, Ottoman rule prevented 
Muslim and Christian Cypriots from becoming solely Cypriot.  
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In 1821, Greece began agitating for Cyprus’s inclusion as “part of ‘Mother 
Hellas.’”17  This spurred the development of a new political ideology that would, over 
time, come to be known as enosis: union with Greece.  In this early incarnation, leaders 
of the Greek Orthodox Church encouraged Greek Cypriots to rediscover their Greek 
heritage, and to push back against Ottoman authority.18  Meanwhile, the Turkish Muslims 
remained bound to the Ottoman sultan, for neither he nor his religion deemed it 
acceptable to assert any similar degree of nationalism.  Turkish Cypriots’ failure to 
develop their own brand of nationalism until the mid-twentieth century divided both 
groups “into separate communities [and] prevented the formation of an institution within 
which they could lay the foundation of a cohesive national consciousness.”19  
Simultaneously, then, while the Greek Cypriot community grew ever distinct, assertive, 
and pro-enosis, the Turkish Cypriots continued to look toward the unrelenting sultan as 
the island’s legitimate ruler.  The Ottomans’ administrative tactics in Cyprus and its 
cultural similarities with the Turkish Cypriots left a strong mark even after Ottoman rule 
ended.  The Republic of Turkey emerged in 1922, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, who governed with hyper-nationalist tendencies.  The new government quickly 
found in the Turkish population of Cyprus an ethnic ally that could, with assistance, 
defend Turkey against Greece’s encroachment in the southeastern Mediterranean.  Over 
the next several decades, Muslim Cypriots formulated their own distinct Turkish-inspired 
brand of nationalism.  Where the Greek Cypriots had reached out to Greece, Turkish 
Cypriots turned to the new Turkish Republic for emotional and financial support.  To a 
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certain extent, British officials encouraged this sentiment.  It is, after all, easier to rule an 
island divided by competing ideologies than one united by anti-colonialist sentiment. 
Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974.  At that time, it became apparent that the 
Turkish leadership continued to work within the same Turkish nationalist frame it had 
used for fifty years.  Despite the fourteen years of independence, Turkish authorities still 
identified Turkish Cypriots as compatriots who deserved physical and financial support 
against the enosis movement.  Supporting the Turkish Cypriots, however, constituted 
only a part of the story.  Turkey’s interference was part of a larger plan to prevent a 
Greek stronghold in the eastern Mediterranean.  Turkey landed troops on Cyprus less 
than a week after supporters of the enosis movement had launched a coup against 
President Makarios.20  Publicly, the mission intended to return the island’s balance of 
power to that laid out by the 1960 constitution.21  Before that summer, Turkey had 
typically refrained from military action in Cyprus, even when Greeks targeted Turkish 
Cypriot communities.22  Its direct involvement in 1974, then, suggests the state viewed 
itself as the Turkish Cypriots’ sole defender, and this coup as a grievous insult to state 
sovereignty.  Moreover, it illustrates that the island continued to play the role of proxy in 
another tense standoff between Greece and Turkey.  After all, if Greece had led a 
successful coup in the Eastern Mediterranean, then Turkey’s western borders were at risk 
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for attack.  Political reasons, rather than humanitarian ones, prompted the invasion.  
Turkey had retained the Ottoman-era’s colonial policies, and its continued patronage of 
the Turkish Cypriots kept the island’s major populations separate.  By landing forces on 
Cyprus in July 1974, Turkey both publicly demonstrated its support for the Turkish 
Cypriots, and defied Greek expansionist measures. 
United Kingdom 
British policy in Cyprus reflected Britain’s attempts to maintain its influence in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.  Following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), Cyprus 
became a protectorate of Great Britain.  Later, in the aftermath of the First World War, 
Britain formally annexed the island.  For the next forty years it relied on Cyprus’s prime 
location to ensure access to Middle Eastern oil and political developments.  Anthony 
Eden, Prime Minister in the 1950s, stated: “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our 
supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.”23  For 
the British, loss of complete control over Cyprus spelled doom.  When Cypriots began 
agitating for independence in the 1950s, British officials responded with “draconian 
measures” in an attempt to cling to their island base.24  They also worked hard to 
downplay the threat posed by the Cypriot independence movement.  During a June 1955, 
cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Eden portrayed discord on Cyprus as the outgrowth of 
Greco-Turkish problems, rather than as a purely anti-colonial struggle.25  Truthfully, the 
independence movement was significantly divided between Turkish Cypriots, who feared 
a Greek Cypriot-led government, and pro-enosis fighters, who wanted Cyprus to be 
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Greek.  The moderates prevailed during peace talks in London and Zurich between 1959 
and 1960.  However, by suggesting that Greece and Turkey were responsible for the 
recent agitation, Eden simplified the situation.  This portrayal cost the Cypriot 
independence movement some bargaining power, for Eden had depicted it as weak and 
manipulated.  
Despite loss of overt political control in 1960, Great Britain continued to maintain 
a palpable influence over the island.  Two agreements formulated in August 1960 
cemented its authority in Cyprus.  Both significantly undermined the new Cypriot state.  
The United Kingdom, Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece signed the first, the Treaty of 
Guarantee; it legalized outside interference should the island’s status quo be upset.  
(Turkey’s first invasion in 1974 is technically legal according to this provision.)  The 
second agreement, the Treaty of Establishment, secured Cypriot independence from the 
United Kingdom.26  Yet, the document designated two geographical areas, Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia, as British sovereign military bases.  This meant continued British presence on 
the island.  From the very beginning, then, Cyprus’s independence treaties weakened the 
island’s sovereignty.  As the British Empire dwindled, it held onto anything that would 
give it continued relevance.  Cyprus’s documents of independence legalized future 
British involvement in the region, and they also opened the island up to interference by 
other states.  For the tenuous fourteen years following independence, the threat of foreign 
interference hung threateningly over Cypriots’ heads.  
Greece 
 Greece’s involvement in Cyprus grew increasingly belligerent as the twentieth 
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century wore on.  As the enosis movement grew, Greece’s interest in expanding its power 
(and creating a “Mother Hellas”) developed into outright antagonism.  The militant 
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) touted unionist ideas in Cyprus 
during the 1950s independence period, when an independent Cypriot state had not yet 
become a reality.27  A 1967 coup in Greece replaced the monarchy with a military and 
expansionist-minded nationalist leadership, and marked the beginning of a regime 
dedicated to the same principles as EOKA. 28  Greece’s financial and military support of 
EOKA meant the party remained a powerful political actor even after Cypriot 
independence.  In 1967, Greek-backed EOKA leader General George Grivas attacked the 
Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou.  Before the Turkish army 
reacted militarily, the Greeks admitted their hand in the attacks and pulled Grivas from 
the island to avoid a full-blown confrontation.29  By December 1967, Greece had 
increased its troops on Cyprus to about ten thousand,30 despite the fact that the original 
constitution allowed only nine hundred and fifty.31  There is no doubt that Greece 
encroached on Cyprus quite early after independence.  It legitimized its moves claiming, 
like Turkey with the Turkish Cypriots, that Cyprus’s historically Greek culture meant it 
needed to be part of Greece.  By planting officers and troops on Cyprus, Greece was 
preparing to take the island by force.  
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The 1974 coup marked Greece’s most determined effort to bring Cyprus back 
under Greek control.  Led by EOKA and pro-enosis forces on the island, it constituted a 
tremendous breach of national sovereignty, and a betrayal of the documents of 
independence.  Though it quickly became apparent to American officials that Greece 
backed the coup, a regular mid-day broadcast in Athens did not mention anything about 
the uprising. 32  Such silence was suspicious.  According to a memo issued by the 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the day of the coup, “Greek officials 
continue[d] to claim that they knew nothing about the situation.”33  Cyprus’s President 
Makarios fled the country and coup leader Nikos Sampson formed a new pro-enosis 
government.  Greece’s silence on the matter confirmed international fears that Cyprus’s 
“sham” independence had simply provided a cover for the weak Athenian military 
dictatorship to encroach on Cypriot sovereignty.34  Greece’s involvement in the 1974 
coup constituted its most galling enosis venture yet.  It represented a push to annex all 
territories inhabited by a majority of Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians to the Greek 
state.35  Of all the interferences launched by foreign states into Cyprus, Greece’s proved 
the most harmful.  Not only did it characterize Greece and enosis supporters as power 
hungry, but it also served as a severe breach of inter communal goodwill on the island.  
This would have a severely damaging effect on inter communal trust in Cyprus.  Most 
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importantly, Greece’s breach of the Treaty of Guarantee ruined hopes for quick 
reconciliation of Cyprus’s already tense inter-ethnic situation.  
UNFICYP 
In December 1963, four days before Christmas, violence broke out between 
Greeks and Turks in the Cypriot capital of Nicosia.  Known today as Kanli Noel 
(“Bloody Christmas”), the event proved an important turning point in the Cyprus problem 
for three reasons. 36  First, it was the most serious outbreak of violence since 
independence.  Second, it marked the end of a period in which the power-sharing 
constitution might have worked.  Third, the violence led to the formation of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).  With the passage of Resolution 186 
in March 1964, the Cyprus problem became a concern of the entire international 
community.  UNFICYP forces originally had a three-month mandate37 and existed to 
“prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and 
restoration of law and order and a return to normal working conditions.”38  Resolution 
186 limited UNFICYP’s powers, and the force has so far failed to bring about a long-
term resolution.  (UNFICYP still operates on Cyprus today.)  At the same time the UN’s 
presence cemented and perpetuated international involvement in Cyprus.  In the end, 
UNFICYP has only created a stable situation, not a peaceful one.  Little progress toward 
a resolution has been made in the past forty years, and it would seem that the world has 
by now largely forgotten about Cyprus’s division. 
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The Cyprus problem is a result of internationalization.  Its division emerged from 
the legacies of colonialism and geo-political or nationalist aims that exacerbated tensions 
fifty years ago.  Neither the Ottomans nor the British cultivated a unified Cypriot national 
identity.  Post-independence, divergent Greek and Turkish interests ensured their 
countries’ continued presence in Cypriot life, and poisoned ethnic groups against each 
other.  UNFICYP stepped in at a crucial moment, but it has done little besides refereeing 
flare-ups as they happen.  While international interference is not the sole cause of this 
problem’s persistence, we may say that it has until now prevented peace. 
Conclusions 
On the surface, the histories of partition in Ireland and Cyprus look very different. 
However, in both cases a long history of foreign interference, which has taken power 
from the hands of those whose livelihoods are on the line, contributed to the nature of 
each partition.  Historically, as we have seen, Ireland has dealt primarily with England, 
whereas a number of powers vied over Cyprus.  Moreover, the UN took up the Cyprus 
issue.  Despite the significant differences, the effects were very similar. In both countries, 
international interference has caused local populations to lose autonomy, to suffer 
economic and political instability, and to experience an increase in inter communal 
tensions.  In time both Ireland and Cyprus have become frozen conflicts, as the effects of 
partition continue to dominate everyday life.  We will see this clearly in the following 
chapters.  
. 
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Chapter 2: Everyday Realities of Partition 
 
 
Although it is important to understand the larger national, regional, and 
international causes and dynamics of partition, its everyday experience has generally 
been sidelined in historical scholarship.  A number of filmmakers and novelists have 
addressed the realities of partition and ethnic conflict in Ireland.  In particular, the Time 
of Troubles (roughly 1968-1998) has proven to be a popular subject.  In the past ten years 
alone, eight films have addressed the period: Breakfast on Pluto (2005), Fifty Dead Men 
Walking (2008), Five Minutes of Heaven (2009), Hunger (2008), Johnny Was (2006), 
Mickybo and Me (2004), Omagh (2004), Shadow Dancer (2012), and The Wind That 
Shakes the Barley (2006).  Seamus Heaney, the Nobel Prize winning poet from Northern 
Ireland, won international acclaim for his sensitive understanding of the country’s 
contemporary struggles.  After his death last year, a New York Times obituary pointed out 
that “Mr. Heaney was renowned for work that powerfully evoked the beauty and blood 
that together have come to define the modern Irish condition.”39  His popularity was, in 
many ways, due to the conflict at home, and to his ability to make art out of a painful 
subject.  In comparison, the Cyprus problem has received marginal attention.  Memoirs of 
inter communal strife in the 1960s and of invasion in 1974 are rare.  Their English 
translations are even more rare.  Films concerning twentieth century Cyprus exist, but 
they do not gather as large an audience as those that focus on Ireland.  There are two 
possible reasons for this divergence.  First, the troubles in Cyprus are a small footnote in 
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the history of most western states save Great Britain.  As such, films and novels 
concerning the conflict do not receive wide attention in American or European media.  
Second, the conflict in twentieth century Ireland was protracted, visible, and destructive.  
Moreover, the situation remains tense today.  In Cyprus, struggle for control over the 
island was done through political back channels while Americans, Greeks, Brits, Turks, 
and Soviets publically pledged to respect Cypriot sovereignty.  Its complexity inhibits a 
solid understanding of, or appreciation for, the conflict’s artistic opportunities.  Scholars 
like Rebecca Bryant and Olga Demetriou have begun to tackle some of these issues of 
accessibility.  In interviews with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they have successfully 
demonstrated the painful feelings of loss that emerged in the wake of independence, inter 
communal conflict, and partition.  In doing so, they widened the field of historical 
scholarship, and opened up Cypriot history to popular culture.  This chapter would not be 
possible without their works.  Here, I explore the everyday realities of partition by 
looking in particular at the experience of forced migration, and its effects on memory and 
contemporary communal interactions.  
Massive migration frequently accompanies partition, whether we consider the 
seventeen million who crossed the newly established India-Pakistan border after 1947, or 
the nearly three million people who left East Germany for West Germany between 1949 
and 1961.40  Partitions have historically caused thousands, and occasionally millions, of 
individuals to leave their land and possessions, sometimes permanently.  In my particular 
case studies, forced migration was no less devastating.  Ireland’s partition resulted in the 
displacement of twenty-five thousand Catholics from Northern Ireland, and twelve 
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thousand Protestants from South Ireland between 1920 and 1926.41  In Cyprus after July 
1974, approximately twenty thousand Turkish Cypriots went north, and two-hundred 
thousand Greek Cypriots headed south.42  Few remained on the wrong side of the new 
border.  
Policy makers often cite population movements as a necessary prerequisite for 
creating a homogeneous and peaceful society.  They argue that such an artificial process 
of homogenization will, in the long run, protect minorities, prevent civil war, and satisfy 
groups clamoring for autonomy.43  These forced migration policies, though, do not take 
into account the resulting mental and physical trauma placed on communities and 
individuals.  Instead, national, regional and international actors often treat people as 
property.  In general, forced migrations consequently deprive people of their same basic 
necessities: “security, shelter, sources of food and water, livelihood, and community 
support systems.”44  Many often find themselves living in temporary refugee camps or 
makeshift shelters.  Moreover, physical displacement demands an emotional resilience, as 
those who leave their land “also leave behind their past - their photo albums, the tree that 
they planted when their first child was born, their homes, their neighbors, their social 
network.”45  In addition, in many cases we see that an initial physical displacement often 
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results in years of migratory existence and repeated future displacements.46  There is no 
doubt that, more often than not, migration degrades the very people it means to protect.  
Displaced persons’ temporary settlements are frequently sites of conflict rather 
than the havens of peace touted by pro-partition officials.  Food and water, as well as 
living space, farmland, and public services (health centers and schools), grow 
increasingly competitive the longer violence and displacement continue.47  As the 
temporary becomes permanent, displaced persons are forced to decide whether or not to 
stay in an increasingly hostile area, or to pick up and move once again.  
Ireland 
In the Irish case population displacement occurred in two waves.  Following 
partition in 1921, Protestants moved north and Catholics south.  Violence and migration 
has led to the development of enclaves in Northern Ireland’s major cities.  While the first 
wave of displacement is typical of partitioned communities, the second is rather unusual: 
partition aims to create homogeneous societies and so further internal displacement 
should be superfluous.  However, the continued inter communal turmoil in Northern 
Ireland has forced many civilians to seek shelter within their ethnic communities.  In this 
project, I focus primarily on migration within the North.  Here, displacement and 
segregation serves as a daily reminder to the local population that their lives are 
physically and emotionally contained and controlled.  As late as 2011, thirteen years after 
the Good Friday Agreement, local neighborhoods (religiously grouped) used flags to 
stake out their territory, and to inhibit notions of crossing over and cooperating with the 
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other side.48  In Catholic communities fly the orange, white, and green flags of Ireland; 
Union Jacks are prevalent in Protestant areas.49  In an effort to separate the two 
communities, residents have built “peace walls” of “steel, concrete, and barbed wire” 
following the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s.50  The effects of such dividers, 
however, are more harmful than helpful.  By physically preventing contact, the walls 
discourage dialogue and everyday interactions between communities.  It is these customs, 
not estrangement, that lead to peace.  Despite a recent announcement by Northern 
Ireland’s first minister that all peace walls would be demolished by 2023, most who live 
alongside the walls fear that inter communal violence will begin anew once the barriers 
are removed.51  Over the decades, these physical borders have hardened emotional 
division as integration becomes increasingly unlikely. 
Decades of ongoing tension have led to increasingly polarized attitudes within the 
North’s major cities.  In 2001, Protestants in a Belfast neighborhood stoned and taunted 
Catholic students on their way to school.  Journalist Marjorie Miller points out that this 
“Catholic march to school between police lines, and the efforts of angry Protestants to 
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stop the parents and children, is not a fight over integration as it was during the U.S. civil 
rights movement.  It is a fight for separation, and for defining boundaries.  It is a turf war 
between tribes that Protestants fear they are losing.”52  As this is neither a new 
development nor an isolated incident, it then comes as no surprise that communities 
would gravitate to the safety of an isolated area.  A 1973 report by the Northern Ireland 
Community Relations Committee found that nearly forty thousand people had left their 
homes due to threats, intimidation, and outright violence by the opposing religious 
group.53  Little has changed over the past forty years: Catholics and Protestants alike 
continue to live in a climate of perpetual fear.  The formation of enclaves should be a 
method of temporary protection, but in Ireland it has become permanent. 
Frank Delaney in his novel Ireland makes a striking observation: “In Ireland 
history never ends.”54  More recently, the principal of a Catholic secondary school in 
Northern Ireland admitted that, “‘We’re obsessed with history here.’”55  In the sixteen 
years since the Good Friday Agreement, much has changed in Northern Ireland.  Belfast, 
once a symbol of entrenched grievances, “is now a jewel of restored Victorian 
architecture and trendy boutiques.”56  To a great extent, it has succeeded both in 
rebuilding and shrugging off loaded religious identities.  However, journalist Joshua 
Hammer noted that, just beneath the surface, old rivalries continue to simmer.   
Brightly painted murals juxtapose images of the late Queen  
Mother and the Ulster Freedom Fighters, a notorious Loyalist  
paramilitary group. Other wall paintings celebrate the Battle  
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of the Boyne, near Belfast, the 1690 victory of Protestant King  
William III over Catholic King James II, the deposed monarch  
attempting to regain the British throne…Another half mile away,  
in the Catholic Ardoyne neighborhood, equally lurid murals,  
of IRA hunger strikers, loom over brick row houses where the  
armed struggle received wide support.57  
 
In Northern Ireland, approximately fifty percent of schoolchildren attend 
institutions where ninety-five percent or more of the student body practices the same 
religion.58  Segregated education leaves a long-term mark.  Not only does it instruct 
students according to different worldviews and ideologies, but it also restricts their 
employment opportunities after graduation by emphasizing that they are Protestant or 
Catholic.59  Peter Robinson, a Unionist leader in Northern Ireland, called his country’s 
current education system as “a benign form of apartheid.”60  Its very nature has 
maintained and, in some ways, strengthened cultural divisions in Northern Ireland post-
1998.  Despite the positive language of the Good Friday Agreements – dialogue, 
tolerance – little progress has been made in the North.61  History, it would seem, cannot 
be forgotten.  The first step, many argue, is integration and an end to the enclave 
communities.  It will not be easy: the years of violence have left a bloody stain that will 
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be hard to remove, and even harder to forgive.  Until then, though, there is little hope that 
displacement and isolation will cease to be an issue. 
Cyprus 
In the traditional view of modern Cypriot history, the island experienced mass 
migration for the first time in 1974.  Historians have represented this seismic event 
following the Turkish invasion as a rather simple process.  Greeks quickly moved south 
to avoid the violence and Turks moved north to join their “saviors.”  Of course, this 
narrative is far too simple and fails to account for the fact that inter communal violence 
(or the threat of it) had displaced Turkish Cypriots several times since 1955, when EOKA 
began to campaign for enosis.  However, Kanli Noel in 1963 represented the first time in 
post-independence Cyprus that inter communal violence displaced the Turkish Cypriots.  
That year, Cyprus’s attempt to operate under a power-sharing constitution came to an 
abrupt halt with the publication of President Makarios’s “Thirteen Points.”  This public 
letter – which ran in a paper controlled by the Greek Communal Chamber in Cyprus – 
forced the country to decide between upholding colonial-era tensions or foregoing them 
for some hazy, as-yet-undefined concept of Cypriot unity.  It contained thirteen 
amendments that aimed to foster unity in the new and divisive Cypriot government.62  
Many of his proposals might have streamlined the sluggish and rather incompetent 
administration.  Makarios, for instance, suggested abolishing the veto power of the 
President and Vice President, as well as the standing requirement for separate communal 
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majorities in the House of Representatives.63  He also argued that the election of 
President and Vice President of the House of Representatives should not be done on a 
communal basis but, rather, by the body as a whole.64  In addition, and perhaps most 
offensive to the Turkish Cypriots, he suggested shifting the current ratios of ethnic 
representation in the public service (70 Greeks to 30 Turks), security forces (70:30), and 
army (60:40).65  He ultimately wished “to bring them into line with the ratio of Greeks to 
Turks in the population as a whole.”66  After the letter’s publication, tensions on the 
island rose.  After violence broke out in late December, Turkish Cypriot officials in the 
Cypriot government refused to work with their Greek Cypriot counterparts.  They 
claimed that President Makarios intended to establish a Greek dominated-government, 
thereby denying Turkish Cypriots the active voice in Cypriot politics that they had long 
enjoyed.  Approximately twenty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots (about one-fourth of the 
island’s total population), equal parts appalled and terrified, fled their homes and 
congregated in one of seventeen ethnic enclaves.67  These were often adjacent to the 
country’s biggest cities, such as the capital Nicosia, which housed twenty thousand 
Turkish Cypriots.68  Over the next decade, these isolated communities’ populations 
would rise and fall with the perceived level of threat posed by the Greek Cypriots.  The 
Turkish Cypriot leadership’s decision to encourage the formation of ethnic enclaves 
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exacerbated a tense situation.  By the time of Turkey’s intervention in 1974, Cyprus’s 
population had been divided for years; partition simply legalized an unsavory reality. 
 
Turkish Cypriots 
For many Turkish Cypriots, life in the enclaves provided a sense of protection.  
Although heavily militarized, the communities were ethnically homogeneous, and this 
offered a break from the steadily intensifying inter communal relations on the island.  
When families first started to arrive, they immediately built perimeters demarcating the 
enclave’s territory.  After December 1963, about four thousand Turkish Cypriots who had 
worked in the government did not return to their posts.69  They instead began to govern 
the separate enclave communities, and challenged Greek Cypriot claims to authority over 
the entire island.  Greek officials banned certain imports to and exports from the 
enclaves, hoping that this would weaken the Turkish Cypriot leadership and prevent it 
from building either international legitimacy or alliances.  From December 1963 until 
March 1968, in an effort to make life unbearable, the Greek government blockaded the 
enclaves.70  One Turkish Cypriot recalls that, “There was nothing, absolutely nothing, at 
the time. Imagine, the Greek Cypriots wouldn’t let anything into the enclaves – not a nail, 
not clothes, not food. We were living on rations from the Red Crescent – dried beans and 
dried chickpeas.”71  The Greek blockade also prevented tires, telephones, coal, and 
building materials from entering the enclaves.  This meant that the displaced Turks could 
not build comfortable (or permanent) housing; many lived in tents or insufficient shelters.  
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Following violence in 1963, villagers in Kokkina/Erenköy were trapped there for the next 
decade.72  For the next year, they struggled by on limited rations.  Nafiye, a young 
woman at the time, remembers “They would give a small bread to four people. One little 
slice of bread, a few olives. We would slice the olives into little pieces…”73  Finally, in 
1965, the Red Crescent provided the community with tents; they lived in these for the 
next three or four years.74   
Despite this poverty and isolation, a sense of solidarity emerged within and 
around the enclave system.  As Turkish Cypriots struggled to survive, they also 
developed a sense of self-sufficiency that strengthened their ethnic identity.  Theirs was 
both a “fight for existence” and one “to exist.”75  Indeed, for many Turkish Cypriots, life 
in the enclaves served as their ground zero, an opportunity to rebuild society at all levels.  
They “very quickly re-created within the enclaves all the functions of a ‘real’ state.”76  
This included government offices and bureaucratic practices.  In the years leading up to 
1974, life in the enclaves became normalized and equalized.  One older woman 
remembers the period fondly: “All the parties we had! We’d wear evening gowns to go to 
each other’s houses. Can you imagine?”77  As Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay (a 
political analyst) comment, “Such are the stories of the period: deprivation and dances, 
crowding and concerts, child soldiers and beauty contests.”78  Turkish Cypriot solidarity 
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in this period derived from their isolation, and from their dependence on one another.  A 
Turkish Cypriot journalist, Ahmet Tolgay, remembers this period with nostalgia.  
If they ask me, “Is there any period of your life to which you  
would want to return?” I would answer without hesitation,  
“The ten-year period between 1964 and 1974.” Of course, this  
period covers the most painful years of the Turkish Cypriot  
people’s history. But who can claim that beauty can’t be created  
out of pain? … What was good and magical was the social  
solidarity that rejected this unjust and unfeeling imprisonment.  
The solidarity was made up of the sort of love, sharing,  
self-denial, tolerance, and heartfelt hope that had not been  
seen in the more than 400 years of Turkish Cypriot history.  
We laughed together, we cried together. Even if they were  
scattered in ghettoes around the island like broken pieces of  
glass, we were like a family that shares everything in those  
days…79 
During the brief interludes of peace, when Turkish Cypriots ventured beyond the 
enclaves’ barricades, they “were faced with the humiliating recognition that a prosperous 
Greek lifestyle surrounded them on every hand.”80  The Turks’ displacement encouraged 
the maturation of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, which supported the community through 
the tense decade-long standoff with Greek Cypriot forces.  However, it also encouraged a 
culture of segregation.  In 1959, 88 Greek Cypriots and 624 Turkish Cypriots lived in 
Malia, a mixed village in the country’s southwest.  By 1964, the Greek Cypriot 
population had swelled to 250, while the number of Turkish Cypriots had shrunk to 
281.81  Over the next decade, this process would be repeated time and again, making it 
increasingly difficult to envision an integrated Cyprus. 
                                                
79 Ibid., 639.   
80 Ibid., 644. 
81 “Summary of Incidents 3 July 1964,” 3 July 1964, UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia, 
Operations Branch – Summary of Incidents 1964-1972, S-0678-0001, United Nations 
Archives.  
  39 
 Following the 1974 war, Turkish Cypriots underwent displacement once more.  
That year, approximately forty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots moved to the north out of 
fear of retaliation for Turkey’s invasion.82  After the dust settled, Turkish troops occupied 
just less than forty percent of Cypriot territory, and the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
established its authority over the northern part of the island.  For Ramadan, a child during 
the invasion, the trip north was long, arduous, and crowded: “I came to the north in a 
minibus filled with 25 people all on top of each other, through back roads. It was a two-
and-a-half hour journey, but it seemed like two-and-a-half months.”83  Technically, the 
Turkish Cypriot Provisional Government distributed land by lot, but realistically, many 
Turkish Cypriots “found homes they liked and squatted there.”84  In the years following 
partition, the new Turkish Cypriot regime allotted land through a system that rewarded 
those who had fought between 1958 and 1974.85  In doing so, it perpetuated the guarded 
and militaristic attitudes that had characterized Turkish Cypriot attitudes for so many 
decades.  After their 1974 movement north, many within the community felt disappointed 
and dissatisfied with their new situation.  Displacement this time was a final blow to the 
old order.  A sense of finality emerged, as did unhappiness with the current situation.  A 
Turkish journalist in 1976 mentioned that this sentiment permeated conversations with 
Turkish Cypriots he had encountered.  “No matter with whom I speak, they sigh, ‘Oh, sir, 
I had such a house, such shops, such properties in the south.’ I’ve seen very few people 
who were satisfied with what they had received.”86  Öncel, a Turkish Cypriot child during 
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the decade of displacement noted that, “his family never fully ‘settled’ in the north, as 
they were always anticipating a return to their village.”87  Orhan, another child, recalled 
to Rebecca Bryant: “It was really hardest for the older people, for instance a man’s a 
farmer and is used to waking up at five every morning and going to his fields, and he 
comes here to Bellapais [in the north], and what’s he supposed to do?”88  (Nearly 
seventy-five percent of Turkish Cypriots who were displaced in 1974 lived in rural 
villages.  Their migration meant they lost their sole form of subsistence.89)  In many 
ways, the ten-year enclave period gently introduced Turkish Cypriots to the realities of 
displacement.  It was only in 1974 that the community underwent the trauma of 
displacement.  That July, the Turkish invasion was a point of no return, and Turkish 
Cypriots finally suffered the extent of forced migration’s repercussions.  For nearly forty 
years following, they were cut off from the land they had owned for generations and from 
the fields they had cultivated since childhood.  Besides being geographically disorienting, 
Turkish Cypriots’ exile to the north was a blow to their sense of self. 
Greek Cypriots 
For the Greek Cypriots, the 1974 war was similarly traumatizing in that it cut 
them off from ancestral land in the north.  Unlike Turkish Cypriots, though, the Greeks 
had no enclave community into which they could withdraw.  Instead of the optimistic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, Greeks remember their movement in 1974 with 
bittersweet sadness, and a persistent sense that injustice was done.  In July of that year, 
Turkish troops first landed at Kyrenia, a town on the island’s northern coast.  Reports 
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from Greek Cypriots in the area paint the attack as “particularly brutal” and they accuse 
the Turkish army of “employing tactics [intended to] terrorise the civilian population into 
retreat.”90  Rape, torture, and hostage taking are among the accusations leveled by Greek 
Cypriots soon after the violence concluded.  Many Greeks sought refuge on the British 
bases before moving on to refugee camps or the major cities.  Olga Demetriou, a social 
anthropologist, conducted a series of interviews with Greek Cypriot refugees and their 
descendants.  Their responses reveal a great deal of the same sentiments that Turkish 
Cypriots did in interviews with Rebecca Bryant.  Many displaced persons from both sides 
were under the impression that they would return home shortly.  “What stayed with me is 
that we left in the clothes that we were wearing. I was in shorts, a T-shirt, and 
clogs…‘Nothing will happen,’ I insisted. ‘It’s only for a few days and we are coming 
back.”91  Attachment to land and Cyprus’s natural features also figured prominently in 
both narratives.  A profound sense of loss permeates everything.  Sonia, an expectant 
grandmother in 1974, revealed “most of all I miss the sea, the shores, the sunsets. The 
sunset was unbelievable. The whole of Kyrenia turned golden at sunset…The house itself 
was warm and beautiful.”92  Nadia, a teenager then, painted an idyllic picture in her 
interview. “I remember everything about the house. The verandas with flowerbeds that 
my grandmother used to plant with lilies…Citrus trees in the garden and the two fig trees, 
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one with big figs, one with small, a vine, and mulberry branches hanging over from the 
neighbour’s garden where the kids used to gather to eat the fruit.”93  She added,  
today I have a recurring dream that as if by magic the fences  
open up and I find my house. In another dream I am allowed  
to go up to a point but not beyond that[, and] this affects me much  
more…I feel I lost part of my life for which I never stopped  
mourning. I may have grown up, got married, lived in another  
country, but I have always felt that something happened to me  
about which I was completely unable to do anything, that they  
stole a part of my life…I lost my memories, the smells of my  
city, an integral part of my life…I feel as if I have lived all  
this time without a sense of belonging.94   
 
Many others Demetriou interviewed expressed a similar feeling of loss.  This 
sentiment was not voiced as frequently in Bryant’s talks with Turkish Cypriots, perhaps 
because every new displacement progressively severed their ties with both their ancestral 
land and the notion of a peaceful united Cyprus.  In many ways, they understood the 
reality better than did the Greek Cypriots. 
 Another noteworthy difference between the narratives of displaced Turks and 
Greeks is the Greeks’ preference to remember pre-1974 as a simpler and more peaceful 
time.  Dimitris, a Greek Cypriot, was born in 1976, but his family was displaced and so 
he grew up with their stories.  Sitting behind his desk is a picture of Kyrenia harbor in the 
north, now in the Turkish-occupied territory.  “…[it] was painted before 1974 and it 
shows [Pentadaktylos] as a green mountain. This is a very different picture to what we 
grew up with…bare, and figuring in these songs of return. In this picture it is something 
different, with a small harbor with five fishing boats in it. Much simpler….”95   
 Greek Cypriots look back to pre-1974 wistfully and, perhaps, idealistically.  The 
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plight of Turkish Cypriots during the same period plays little role in their memories of 
Cyprus during that time.  The focus, rather, is on injustices done to the Greeks, and the 
lingering hatred nearly forty years after the war.  Dimitris continued, “I hear all this 
empty rhetoric, which is actually not empty at all, it has a very specific content: division. 
Either on our own here, or on our own everywhere…us here, you there…with some 
minor land adjustment, us in our schools, you in your own, we hating you, you hating us, 
and that’s it.”96  Demetriou and Bryant published these interviews only two years ago.  
The persistence of such sentiments, nearly forty years after partition, highlights the 
distance that must be traveled before reconciliation can occur.  More importantly, they 
serve to underline the negative aspects of displacement: almost a half-century has passed, 
and these emotions still hover close to the surface. 
Conclusions 
Both Cypriot and Irish communities have witnessed the polarizing impact of 
migration.  In Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have remained isolated from each 
other for over forty years.  In Northern Ireland, Protestants and Catholics have mixed to 
tenuous effects for nearly a century.  The resulting differences are astounding.  Whereas 
the Irish discuss each other with vivid animosity and blame, Greeks and Turks view their 
separation with bittersweet sadness.  It is the loss of land and peace that plagues their 
memories, not bombs and raids.  The physical boundary that divides Cyprus has kept the 
two sides separate, like little children during a spat.  In Northern Ireland, the borders 
between Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods are technically permeable, but highly 
charged: “Whether you can see a boundary or you can’t see a boundary, we all know 
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there are boundaries.  People rarely cross over [them].”97  In both situations, migration 
and borders have prevented peace.  The answer is not, as many Irish believe, further 
division, for this would simply make the situation increasingly unstable.  If the Northern 
Irish voted to split their land into Catholic and Protestant regions, they would come 
across some people who might refuse to leave their homes.  From the beginning, then, the 
idea of a homogenous and peaceful community would be compromised.  Moreover, as 
people moved into smaller areas, the borders would run the risk of becoming increasingly 
polarized, effectively trapping the nominally homogenous population in its new 
neighborhood.  Instead, communities should be integrated.  This will take time, for it 
needs to become socially acceptable before it can be practically implemented.  In order to 
prevent further displacement, integration should first take place in the schools.  This will 
teach the next generation to cooperate and work together, to see each other as students 
and humans, not as enemies.  In both Ireland and Cyprus, partition has led to the forced 
migration of thousands of people.  There exists in both countries a strong attachment to 
the land, which, for many, defines their past, present, and future.  Displacement, then, 
served as a violent blow to both Cypriot and Irish identities.   
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Chapter 3: Ethnicity and Religion as Markers of Difference 
 
Historians and social scientists have argued that a state’s territorial division leads 
populations to split in one of two ways.  Either, as in Ireland, India, and Palestine, they 
divide along ethnic or religious lines; or, as in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, they part 
along political or ideological lines.  Note that all those in the first group are former 
British colonies that divided in the beginning of the twentieth century or immediately 
following World War II, and that those in the second category happened in the context of 
the Cold War.  Over the past century, it has become apparent that a state divides along 
whichever line, religious or political, it deems most influential and important in everyday 
life.  In Ireland, India, and Palestine, this was ethnic; in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, it 
was political.  Yet, following the assertions of the sociologist Robert Schaeffer, I believe 
there are serious flaws in labeling demographical division as purely ethnic or political.98  
More often than not, the phrase “ethnic division” has served in past scholarship as a 
metaphor for ancient and intractable inter communal strife.  Scholars across various 
fields, however, have demonstrated that a group rarely, if ever, divides because of ancient 
or primordial inter communal hatred.  Instead it has become clear that most ethnic 
conflicts result from recent political, economic, or social issues.  Still, foreign 
policymakers, especially in Cyprus, see an advantage in encouraging bilious relations 
between two groups, and then claiming that this new anger is the product of a lingering 
ancient hatred.  By blaming ethnic rivalry, policymakers encourage a conflict’s observers 
and participants to forego a rational understanding of a problem “that [has] nothing to do 
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with the complexities of ethnicity.”99  This mindset grows dangerous if allowed to 
continue: it encourages polarized mentalities both locally and globally.  In general, 
blaming inter communal violence purely on ethnic rivalries is a gross simplification that 
fails to take into account other internal and external factors.  
Likewise, claiming that Cold War partitions occurred exclusively along 
ideological (that is, Communist and non-Communist) lines fails to consider the 
complexities of political realities on the ground.  Just as political, economic and social 
ambitions determined the actions of competing ethnic groups, so too did they guide 
bilateral superpower politics in the second half of the twentieth century.  In Cyprus, the 
newly independent government’s interest in autonomy led it to seek membership with the 
Non-Aligned Movement.  Its decision was motivated by fears of subordination should it 
join the East-West political drama.  While it was partitioned during the Cold War, it did 
not split according to Cold War ideologies.  The situation was similar in post-war 
Germany, where the Soviets and Americans each wanted a united Germany, but only one 
“that would serve its own [i.e. American or Soviet] interests.”100  The United States, 
therefore, unified Germany’s three western-occupied zones (1946), refused to extract 
reparations (1947), and introduced a new currency (1948).101  Soviet officials matched 
American movements: they introduced their own currency (1948, two days after the 
Americans) and blocked Allied access to Berlin.  Soon, due to economic strategies by the 
post-war superpowers, Germany was split.102  Neither side in the Cold War was 
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motivated exclusively by ideology; to say as much is tantamount to ignoring the 
underlying motives of each superpower, or the resistance movements that worked to 
undermine the authority of each bloc.  
Ireland 
Ireland partitioned in 1921 because of external interference, as I discussed in 
Chapter One.  Moreover, according to the historian Daniel Webster Hollis III, the British 
determined the shape and nature of the division.  In this case English authorities 
encouraged and exploited religious differences, which eventually forged the dividing line 
between communities in twentieth century Ireland.103  We can first see the dominance of 
religion as dividing marker in the changes in post-partition demographics.  The Protestant 
population in the new Irish Republic had dwindled down to 7.6 percent by 1926.  The 
decline in Protestants was the result of an increase in migration across the border into 
Northern Ireland.104  In the previous chapter I discussed the several boundaries within 
Northern Ireland that are defined by religion, and that separate Catholic and Protestant 
communities.  Yet, it would be a mistake to call these divisions (or the ones between the 
Republic and Northern Ireland) “ancient.”  English authorities cultivated, hardened, and 
exploited them for nearly five hundred years through quasi-colonial policies that 
oppressed Catholicism and favored Protestantism.  A close look at Irish history offers an 
explanation for the persistence of these religiously defined borders, and highlights the 
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English, i.e. foreign, imposition of such divisions.  This, once again, illustrates the 
negative results of external interference.  
In the 1530s, English authorities in Ireland established the Church of Ireland as a 
way to implement the Protestant Reformation among what they considered to be a wild 
and savage population.  From early on, Protestants in Ireland retained a deep animosity 
for the Catholics, likening the Pope to the Anti-Christ.105  Over the centuries, meanwhile, 
the Irish Catholics grew to equate the Irish Protestants with the English conqueror, whose 
sole goal was to destroy and control Irish culture and territory.  Indeed the relationship 
between Catholics and Protestants on the island may best be described as that between 
conquerors and the conquered.106   Although Ireland was never an English colony in the 
traditional sense, it is appropriate to consider the population’s separation after 1921 in the 
context of other British colonies.  The division happened essentially along religious lines, 
and the reason for this lies with the British introduction of Protestantism several centuries 
earlier.  The current communal divisions between Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland are informed by this long history of dispute between the two communities.   
When the British parliament crafted the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, the 
six counties of Northern Ireland emerged as a self-governing and Protestant region in the 
island’s north.107  After 1921, Catholics accounted for approximately forty-three percent 
of the population in Northern Ireland.  Communal divisions there grew. 108  This new 
minority refused to accept the Border, and Catholic nationalist parties abstained from 
participating in the new government under the assumption that they would never be able 
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to have real authority in the North’s political system.109  Meanwhile, the Protestant 
majority lived in fear of reprisal from those in the “powerful and ideologically intense 
Catholic Church” for supporting centuries of anti-Catholic policies.110  As both sides 
constructed barriers that segregated Catholic and Protestant communities, the North spent 
the next forty years in an increasingly polarized climate.  In 1968, a group of English 
loyalists, “fearing a rebellion under the guise of civil rights agitation,” attacked a Catholic 
community.111  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) retaliated and, in doing so, set off a 
thirty-year terrorist campaign that the Good Friday Agreement, signed by British, Irish, 
and Northern Irish politicians, tenuously ended only in 1998.112   
In the sixteen years since that agreement, outright animosity has only marginally 
declined.  In its place have emerged deeply entrenched views that offer little room for 
reconciliation.  It is worth mentioning again the September 2001 stone-throwing incident 
in Belfast.113  “That’s what happens when you get them separated like that,” a Protestant 
cab driver said casually to a reporter.114  This cab driver’s statement is innocuous and 
vague: he identifies no specific threat or viewpoint that might tie him directly to Northern 
Ireland.  He has, it would appear, largely accepted the violence and segregation.  This 
brief overview of Northern Ireland’s last century is meant to highlight two observations.  
First, for nearly five hundred years, the British used religion as an instrument for 
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division.  English authorities’ anti-Catholic policies allowed Protestant officials in Ireland 
to keep much of the population subjugated.  By 1921, the idea of separated communities 
had become so ingrained in global and local perception of Irish culture that it was 
difficult to imagine any other reality.  Second, partition exists in three places in Ireland: 
between the Republic and Ulster, between the North’s Protestant and Catholic 
communities, and in the minds of those Irish who cannot fathom an integrated North.115  
The thirty-year violence in post-partition Ireland has no counterpart in Cyprus.  
This can be attributed to two factors in particular: the continued presence of UNFICYP, 
and the total separation between Turkish and Greek communities.  Though the 
peacekeepers have done little in the way of resolving Cypriot partition, they have to a 
great extent limited the intrusion of division and inter communal animosity into everyday 
life.  Likewise, the complete polarization of the island’s population means that ethnic 
conflicts like those before partition no longer pose a serious threat to the island’s welfare.  
Moreover, memories of the last significant burst of inter communal violence in 1974 have 
faded as new generations have appeared.  In Cyprus, the border has been relatively silent, 
and it is up to those who remember the earlier conflicts to keep the tension alive.  In 
Ireland, there is no other option.  
Cyprus 
Both British colonial and Cold War politics have shaped the partition of Cyprus 
and inter communal relations on the island.  British rule from 1878 to 1960 left its mark, 
and global politics played a hand in the island’s 1974 division.  Still, although Cold War 
politics were important, I would argue that decades of British rule had a much greater 
                                                
115 This observation is well articulated in Frank Delaney’s novel Ireland, which follows a 
young boy as he travels through 1960s Ireland and attempts to understand his country’s 
history. In particular, see page 341. 
  51 
impact on Cyprus’s partition history.  Following Turkey’s invasion in 1974, Cyprus split 
almost entirely along ethnic lines.  Today, native Turkish Cypriots and immigrant Turks 
comprise nearly all of the north’s population.  The south, in turn, is home to nearly all of 
the island’s Greek Cypriots.  Public opinion in 1974 was that these inter communal 
differences were as ancient as they were intractable.  Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots could not coexist.  In an article from June 1964, the Irish Times discussed 
UNFICYP’s failure to significantly ease tensions on Cyprus, and suggested that it was 
“wrong to think that divisions as deep and as ancient as those that separate the Greek-
Cypriots from the Turks could yield to a few months’ cooling off.”116  Over eighty years 
of British policies had helped divide Greek and Turkish Cypriots in seemingly 
irresolvable ways.   
One of Britain’s first policies was that of favoring the island’s minority 
population, the Turkish Cypriots.  From early on, they vaulted the group into positions of 
power to prevent the Greek Cypriot majority from strengthening its claim to self-rule and 
independence.  This aligned well with the interests of Turkish Cypriots, who feared 
Greek Cypriots would use any authority to implement enosis.117  By 1919, the Turkish 
Cypriots had formed the “backbone of the British administrative system,” and had grown 
to be a valuable ally.118  Though they comprised roughly one-quarter of Cyprus’s 
population, Turkish Cypriots represented 420 members of the 789-member police 
force.119  Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots on the Legislative Council (which had only 
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marginal influence in British administrative policies) voted against British policies only 
twice.120  The effects of what may be termed British “divide and rule” policy can be seen 
in the trials of members of Cyprus’s Greek nationalist party EOKA.  In the 1950s, British 
authorities tried and hung many EOKA men, but spared most of those in the Turkish 
Cypriots’ counterpart, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT).121  The British 
decision to favor the Turkish minority inflamed Greek Cypriot opinion towards both the 
colonizers and their clients.  To a great extent, English policies successfully divided the 
Cypriot populations: from 1891 to 1960, the number of mixed villages on the island 
steadily declined as Greeks and Turks increasingly chose to live with their respective 
ethnic communities.122  
The 1960 constitution further confirmed the devastating long-term effects of 
British policy on national unity.  Under the threat of losing British patronage, Turkish 
Cypriots – worried about a Greek monopoly on power and an end to Turkish authority – 
pushed for, and won, an extraordinarily disproportionate level of power.  The constitution 
was grounded in the power-sharing principles of proportionality, coalition, cultural 
autonomy, and minority veto.123  The size of each ethnic group determined its 
representation in parliament (proportionality); both Greek and Turkish Cypriots worked 
together through the Council of Ministers (coalition); each ethnic group had its own 
Communal Chamber at the legislative level (cultural autonomy); and both the Greek 
                                                
120 Ibid., 42.  
121 The British formed a police force to counter EOKA, and drew its members from the 
Turkish Cypriot paramilitary group “Volkan,” which later evolved into TMT. The 
closeness between the British and Turkish Cypriots may explain why so few members of 
TMT were ever tried or convicted of crimes against the crown. (Hitchens, Cyprus, 46.) 
122 In 1891, there were 346 mixed villages; 252 in 1931; and, only 114 in 1960. (Bryant, 
Displacement in Cyprus, 5.) 
123 Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies, 52-3. 
  53 
president and the Turkish Vice President held veto power (minority veto).124  Although 
Turkish Cypriots continued to account for roughly twenty percent of the island’s 
population, the constitution assured them power through legislative procedures that 
rivaled that of the Greek Cypriot community, which constituted approximately eighty 
percent.  The Council of Ministers, for instance, existed to ensure the power of both the 
President and Vice-President; it was comprised of seven Greek Ministers and three 
Turkish Ministers.125  Council decisions required a majority, but either the President or 
the Vice President could veto the result.  In legislative matters, the Greek community 
elected seventy percent of the House of Representatives, and the Turkish community 
elected thirty percent.126  Moreover, Greek representatives elected the Greek President of 
the House of Representatives, and the Turkish delegates elected the Turkish Vice-
President of the House.127  Both groups had their own communal chamber, which held 
legislative power over ethnic-specific issues, such as religious, educational, judicial, and 
cultural matters.128  In fact, they even had the power to tax members of the community.129  
These constitutional guarantees to each communal group reveal two issues with Cypriot 
independence.  First, they illustrate the success of British policies that kept the 
populations divided.  Second, they suggest that the independence documents perpetuated 
these differences by granting each group a significant degree of autonomy.  Moreover, 
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many politicians in Cyprus’s new government were taken from the ranks of each 
nationalist movement; this crippled any attempt at unifying the communities.  Both 
groups “planned for the time when the Republic would break down and there would be a 
free-for-all for territory that would become Greek or Turkish.”130  
In 1963, three years after Cypriot independence, President Makarios published his 
“Thirteen Points” letter.  Turkish Cypriots were outraged with his suggestions, and felt 
that the President had made his first step in pushing them out of the government.  They 
wanted to view the Republic as one composed of two communities, not one composed of 
a majority and a minority.131  Makarios’s suggestions would have threatened this vision, 
and many scholars point to the President’s blunt suggestions as reason for the outbreak of 
violence in December 1963 (Kanli Noel).  While the President’s decision to address the 
public before consulting with his Turkish Cypriot colleagues was unorthodox, it also 
illustrates the incompatibility of Cyprus’s constitution with its reality.  Makarios’s failed 
attempt to break down the ethnic barriers and separatism demonstrates how entrenched 
the idea of separate ethnicities had become in Cypriot culture. 
The Cold War began to overtly affect Cypriot politics after the island’s 
independence.  In the aftermath of 1960 and Britain’s overall loss of global power, 
Turkey, Greece, the United States, and the Soviet Union began to meddle in the island’s 
affairs.132  Cold War politics drove many of their policies, even those from Cyprus itself.  
Though the Cold War system of alliances demanded loyalties from less powerful nations, 
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Cyprus remained relatively impermeable to American and Soviet courtship, and, even 
under pressure, did not renounce its non-aligned status.   
Mid-century American and Soviet policy makers, usually at odds on matters of 
foreign policy, agreed on the future of Cyprus: both wanted partition.  Each camp was 
driven by concern for the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  For 
the United States, NATO’s southern flank had to be protected at any cost.  Throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s, Greece and Turkey frequently prepared to go to war to defend their 
national interests in Cyprus.  Such a regional disturbance would weaken NATO’s 
credibility in the region, and could lead to the spread of Soviet influence.  Moreover, 
Cyprus’s position as a non-aligned state in the Cold War meant that its total 
independence posed “a strategic liability” to the West.133  Hence, American leaders such 
as President Johnson encouraged a systematic division of the island into a Turkish north 
and Greek south.  That would simultaneously (and possibly only temporarily) end the 
Greco-Turkish dispute, and draw Cyprus closer into the non-Communist camp.134  Like 
the British before them, the Americans detracted from Cypriot sovereignty in order to 
maintain larger regional control.  Following the 1974 coup, Joseph Sisco, the 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs at the US Department of State, argued that 
the two objectives of the United States were to “avert war between Greece and 
Turkey…and avert Soviet exploitation of the situation.”135  For Washington, Cyprus 
became another Cold War proxy conflict as soon as it gained independence.  
                                                
133 O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, 109. 
134 Schaeffer, Warpaths, 242.  
135 Meeting minutes, WSAG Meeting, 15 July 1974, Cyprus Crisis (3), box 7, Kissinger-
Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Gerald R. Ford Library. 
  56 
Meanwhile, the Soviets, led by Nikita Krushchev (1894-1971) and Leonid 
Brezhnev (1906-1982),136 also supported Cypriot partition, but because they hoped that it 
would lead to further conflict within NATO.137  The Soviets’ reaction to the 1974 coup 
was not concern for the island’s population or sovereignty.  Rather, they viewed it as an 
opportunity to weaken American prestige.  Accordingly, they blamed American officials 
for instigating the coup in an attempt to make Cyprus into a NATO base.138  This would, 
they feared, bring Americans closer to the Soviet sphere of influence.  It would also 
ensure American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean for the foreseeable future.139   
In general, it can be said that Cold War politics sought to overrule Cypriot 
sovereignty.  Following independence, though, Archbishop Makarios and his new 
government struggled against this.  When faced with the choice of entering NATO or 
joining the Non-Aligned Movement, they chose the latter.  Their decision reflected a 
deep awareness of the Cold War political dilemma.  Had Cyprus entered NATO, 
Greece’s interests would consistently be ignored in favor of Turkey, whose strategic 
importance as neighbor to the Soviet Union ranked it high on the West’s list of allies.  
Turkey also favored Cyprus’s decision to avoid NATO.  If it had joined, the government 
in Ankara would have been prevented from ever intervening in the island’s domestic 
disputes.  “The idea of one NATO member invading another, and the consequences of 
this on alliance unity at the height of the Cold War, would almost certainly ensure that 
the United States and other NATO members would step in to prevent full scale hostilities 
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from occurring.”140  In the years preceding independence, Archbishop Makarios had 
grown increasingly close with leaders of post-colonial states, and in 1955 he attended a 
conference to discuss an Afro-Asian alliance in the face of Soviet and Western policies.  
In 1961, the new president joined leaders of twenty-five other states to create the Non-
Aligned Movement.  And so, Cypriots not only took part, but also helped form a 
movement that separated it from its past colonizers and current questionable allies.  Until 
the end of the Cold War nearly thirty years later, Cyprus remained a member of the Non-
Aligned Movement.  Its decision to forego an alliance with either the East or the West 
highlights a narrative that has been overlooked in many histories of Cyprus.  Typically, 
discussions on the island’s historical politics emphasize its submissiveness and 
subordination.  The new government’s bold decision to take the path of non-alignment 
represents its attempts “to forge its own individual sovereign identity” after years of 
colonization.141  
Cyprus played an important role in Cold War strategies, but it never became a 
breeding ground for Cold War ideology.  The most prominent political issues on the 
island concerned, rather, the idea of ethnic or religious identity.  President Makarios’s 
decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement stifled significant manifestation of Cold War 
ideologies in Cyprus.  As a result, ethnic differences, not political ones, continued to 
dominate post-independence discussions.  Because the British lived on and ruled over 
Cyprus for nearly a century, the relatively new Cold War political divisions played a 
small role in the ultimate division of Cyprus’s ethnic communities.  
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Conclusions 
Though Ireland and Cyprus are on opposite sides of the world, their experiences 
under British rule were remarkably similar.  In both, years of British authority cultivated 
and inflamed communal tension; in both, partition split each country almost exclusively 
between religious and ethnic groups.  Although Cyprus divided during the Cold War, it 
did not do so because of Cold War politics.  The potent effects of British and Ottoman 
colonial policies based on patronage of the Turkish Cypriots, as well as Cyprus’s decision 
to join the Non-Aligned Movement, overpowered other political motivations in 1974.  
That year, Turkey forced partition on Cyprus.  The subsequent migrations, not obligatory, 
resulted in an almost completely ethnically polarized island.  The legacy of British rule in 
Ireland and its policies of religious division meant that the island remained locked in an 
endless cycle of inter communal violence.  Today, Irish religious differences remain both 
powerful and often-violent communal dividers that show little sign of disappearing.  In 
Cyprus, ethnic tensions continue to exist as well, but inter communal violence has largely 
been avoided as a result of UNFICYP and ethnic separation.  For both countries, though, 
the legacy of British policy lingers on, decades after the decolonization movement.  It 
would be impractical to blame the partitions solely on British policies, but there is no 
doubt that they greatly contributed to tension in both cases.   
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Chapter 4: Ireland Reacts to Turmoil in Cyprus 
 
Reactions to events are almost always more interesting than the events 
themselves.  In this final section, therefore, I have selected three key periods in Cypriot 
history and explored the responses of two Irish newspapers, the Irish Times and the Irish 
Independent.  The three instances in question are Cypriot independence, Kanli Noel, and 
the 1974 war.  Not only are all pivotal points in Cyprus’s brief experiment with unified 
independence, but they also present different combinations of the trademarks of partition 
discussed throughout this thesis.  By removing myself from the island’s history, I am able 
to consider the larger implications of these key years on Cyprus’s present situation. 
Irish newspapers were not my first choice.  I originally intended to compare the 
responses of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot journalists.  Due to my language 
limitations and accessibility to the relevant archives, this was not possible.  However, 
Ireland and Cyprus have a startlingly similar past, and the experience and personal 
history of many Irish journalists make their articles a fascinating read.  I chose Irish 
papers – rather than those in another twentieth century partitioned society – for four 
reasons in particular.  First, both countries had a complicated relationship with Great 
Britain that ultimately played a large role in the emergence and persistence of a partition.  
During the early centuries of their rule over Ireland, English authorities took little care to 
understand the island’s geography or its people: “the English colonial presence in Ireland 
remained superimposed upon an ancient identity, alien and bizarre.”142   I saw parallels 
between this relationship and the one inculcated by the British in Cyprus.  In both cases, 
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the British encouraged the separation of ethnic groups; in both, British policies played a 
significant role in the unrest.  Second, both Ireland and Cyprus experienced a partition 
almost entirely along ethnic or religious lines.  In Cyprus, descriptions of the partition 
frequently use the phrases “Turkish Muslim north” or “Greek south.”  One’s land (and, 
by extension, one’s heritage) plays a significant role in how a Cypriot identifies himself 
or herself.143  Likewise, Northern Ireland and Ireland have been locked in a struggle 
characterized (in one sense) by religion for nearly a century.144  Third, Irish newspapers 
are primarily written in English.  (Although, interestingly enough, editorials written in 
Gaelic appeared in the Irish Independent during the period in question.)  While the 
partition and British angles appear in other situations – India, Pakistan, Israel, Palestine – 
the wealth of English sources in Ireland facilitates research and analysis.  Fourth, my 
personal connections to both islands – my mother is Irish and my father is Cypriot – 
heightened the appeal of exploring the countries’ experiences with partition.  
Methodology 
Newspapers primarily report facts; their task is to inform the readership of events 
in the community and the world at large.  As I mentioned earlier, though, reactions to the 
facts provide a great deal more insight into the author and his audience.  For this reason, I 
chose to look at reviews, editorials, Letters to the Editor, photographs, and political 
cartoons.  I studied the Irish Independent entirely on microfilm, and in doing so was 
forced to explore developments on a day-by-day basis.  I did not have the same 
experience with the Irish Times, which I accessed primarily through ProQuest database 
(results filtered for year, subject, and article type).  Nevertheless, the selection of articles 
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studied in this paper are, I feel, representative of each newspaper’s take on Cypriot 
politics between 1959 and 1974.  Both papers addressed each time period from one of 
three angles: as a commentary on the British, as contemplation of the similarities between 
Ireland and Cyprus, and as a general analysis of the situation.  This chapter is organized 
around these themes. 
My decision to analyze the Irish Times and the Irish Independent was not random.  
Each paper represents the opposite end of the political spectrum.  I was interested, 
therefore, to see if they would take different stances on Cypriot independence, inter 
communal fighting, and partition.  The Times, founded in 1859, was staunchly loyalist 
and unionist, and opposed all forms of home rule.145  The Irish Independent, though, has 
tended to favor the idea of a unified Ireland.  (That is, the unification of Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland into one state.146)  These Irish nationalists in general have 
tended to be Catholic, and this religious identification appears periodically in articles 
about Cyprus.147  I do not mean for this chapter to be an intense comparative analysis of 
each partitioned country.148  Rather, it is intended to emphasize that broad similarities 
exist between divided communities, though they be separated by both time and space. 
In general, I expected both to have a negative view of partition, and particularly of 
British involvement in Cypriot politics.  Though they may oppose each other politically, 
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journalists of both papers had lived in a divided country for nearly half a century; I 
expected their experiences would have encouraged an anti-partition attitude.  This proved 
to be the case.  Both the Times and the Independent heavily criticized the British behavior 
towards the idea of Cypriot independence.  Moreover, both papers felt strongly towards 
Turkish intervention in 1974, and quickly foresaw its possible ramifications.  However, 
what interested me the most was the unexpected: the frequency and depth of coverage 
was remarkably different for both the Times and the Independent.  After Kanli Noel, the 
former stayed rather shallow, preferring to address the issues superficially.  The latter, 
though, began reporting on Cypriot events in an extraordinarily inclusive manner.  It 
published Letters to the Editor from both sides and it provided in-depth interviews with 
UN Secretary General U Thant and Archbishop Makarios.  The interest in reaching out 
and instructing readers on the basic facts and their implications is remarkable, and was 
likely done as part of an effort to better acquaint readers with the global political 
environment. 
After reading a number of articles it became clear that, in their reporting, the 
journalists frequently drew parallels between the two islands.  Despite the similarities of 
individual responses to partition, the type of reporting varied significantly between the 
two papers.  Cypriot independence in 1960 received little mention in the Independent 
beyond a brief notice on page nine.149  (By comparison, Kenya’s independence several 
weeks earlier150 had garnered it a front-page article, an editorial, and a further article later 
in the issue.)  In contrast, Irish Times reported and analyzed the negotiations and 
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agreements extensively.  This was the last time it would address Cyprus so intricately.  It 
focused primarily on critiquing the British government, although a great deal of reporting 
concerned the relationship between EOKA leader George Grivas and Archbishop 
Makarios.  Both papers addressed Irish unwillingness to send troops with UNFICYP in 
1964, and both roundly blamed the British for creating the mess in the first place.  In 
1974, though – the year in which many might assume Irish newspapers exploded with 
opinions on the island’s partition – only the Irish Independent did so.  During July and 
August of that year, it began simultaneously reporting the day’s Cypriot developments, 
and carefully analyzing both the events and the major actors.  The Irish Times, in 
comparison, continued to take a broader approach, and wrote primarily about the Greek 
colonels and Turkish government. 
Commentary on the British 
Overwhelmingly, and across all three periods in question, both papers criticized 
British behavior in Cyprus.  However, each differed in the type of coverage it provided.  
During the 1959 independence negotiations, the Irish Times gave readers a blow-by-blow 
description and analysis of British behavior, though it wrote little of Cypriot leaders or 
their attitudes towards the negotiations.  Journalists at that paper, it would seem, viewed 
the outside world through a British lens.  The British famously garnered 99 non-
negotiable square miles on Cyprus that would serve as British military bases after 
independence.151  For the Times, it would seem that this issue was a breaking point.  In 
January 1960, it pointed out that if Great Britain would only “renounce” total control 
over the sovereign bases it could greatly reduce tensions.152  Later that month it wrote 
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that British attitude towards its bases is “unnecessarily severe and undeviating,” and it 
roundly condemned the British after negotiations fell through.153  Great Britain, it pointed 
out, “should know that the problem of keeping military bases in an independent country 
is a sore and sensitive one, especially if that country has only freshly achieved 
nationhood, after a fierce and bitter struggle.”154 Indeed, there is a general sense of 
confusion over why the British refused to be more “accommodating” and relent on their 
demands for military bases.155  If any doubt remained of its position towards Anglo-
Cypriot relations, it was likely dispelled in January 1960 with the following observation: 
“Once more, as has happened so often in the past, Britain has held out the olive branch 
with the mailed fist, and fatally embittered military negotiations.”156  This was the second 
time in a year that the Irish Times referred to Britain in this way.157  The Times’ 
identification as a historically unionist paper suggests it would approve of direct British 
rule in Cyprus. However, frustration is evident in the 1959-1960 articles on Cyprus, and 
it only grows more pronounced with the reemergence of violence in 1963. 
The Irish Independent, in contrast, wrote relatively little about Cypriot 
negotiations on independence.  When it did, the focus was on Anglo-Cypriot discussions 
of sovereign bases and financial assistance.  The similarities with the Irish Times stop 
here, though, because the Independent’s most significant address of the Cyprus problem 
took a sharp stab at British colonial practices.  (While the Times critiqued British policy 
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in Cyprus and merely alluded to other situations, the Independent did so more 
specifically.)  In August 1960, three days before Cypriot independence, the paper 
published the following review of a book about Britain and India:  
[the author] is not sensitive about the natural need of a people  
to express their own particular character in their institutions. He  
writes: “Wherever you lift the corner of the political or administrative  
blanket the things we know are the things that work[,] the things  
that work are the things we know. And the bulk of both are  
British.” This is dangerously near assuming that all peoples have  
the same methods of dealing with each other and of doing their  
work, and that one’s own country’s methods are necessarily the  
best.158  
 
Though the paper’s criticism was directed at the book’s author, it can be viewed in a 
more general sense as the publication’s attitude towards British foreign policy.159  
Whereas the Irish Times skirted around the issue as best it could, and frequently 
employed flowery imagery, the Independent bluntly stated that the British did not always 
do the right thing, and frequently shoved local traditions under the rug in the process.  As 
with the Times, though, 1963 brought a more extreme reaction. 
Both the Irish Times and the Irish Independent reported on Kanli Noel in detail.  
Indeed, it could be argued that this was the first time that Cyprus really figured in Irish 
daily life, for it raised the issue of Irish participation in UNFICYP.  Both papers reported 
the country’s reluctance to join the peacekeeping force.  More importantly, though, both 
papers had the same initial response: condemnation of the British, and criticism towards 
its colonial policies.  A Letter to the Editor in the Irish Times claimed that the 1960 
provisions for Turkish Cypriots had been ridiculous and unworkable, and that the fault 
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rested with the British for privileging the minority group pre-independence.160  It went on 
to say that the British were responsible for fixing this new problem: “There are the ghosts 
of enough murdered Cypriots haunting the corridors of the Colonial Office already.”161  
The inflammatory nature of this comment is remarkable, as is the fact that the Irish Times 
decided to publish it.  It suggests a departure from the rather benign “mailed fist”-type 
comment.  The Irish Independent took a similar approach, and suggested that the British 
were responsible for the “ill-feeling” between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots.162  It is remarkable that both papers, though from opposing ends of the political 
spectrum, united on this issue.  More importantly, these comments were some of the last 
the papers provided on British action in Cyprus.  For them, it would appear that 
responsibility for future Cypriot turmoil rested on the shoulders of the Cypriots 
themselves. 
 The 1974 invasion raised new issues that put to rest any question of British blame, 
and raised, instead, the question of Turkish blame.  This is better addressed in a later 
section, but suffice it to say that neither paper significantly critiqued British policy during 
the 1974 war.  The bulk of criticism emerged, rather, during a period of intense Anglo-
Cypriot relations (1959), and during a time of unanticipated tension (1963).  Neither 
paper provided a strong defense of British policies, even though one was historically a 
staunch unionist.  This is an incredibly important point: regardless of prior experience 
with British policy, both Irish papers ultimately criticized the imperial power.  This is 
likely primarily a product of the times (a post-war anti-colonialism, independence 
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period).  It does, though, indicate a significant shift in favor of the Cypriots that will be 
important to remember when considering how Irish papers treated the Ireland-Cyprus 
similarities. 
Ireland and Cyprus 
From early on, both papers were intimately aware of the similarities between 
Ireland and Cyprus.  After Turkey’s invasion, the inevitable comparisons became 
impossible to ignore, and a writer with the Irish Independent wrote the following rather 
mournful text: 
 For Cyprus is startlingly similar to Ireland in so many ways –  
in its political and religious divisions, in the entrenched attitudes  
of opposing forces, in the suspicion, distrust and fear which  
dominates the thinking of the divided communities, in the tragic 
polarization of the Moslem Turkish Cypriots cut off by sand-bags  
and barbed wire from the Orthodox Greek Cypriots and in the  
strength of the old mythologies. At almost every level, one could  
draw parallels with Catholic republicans and Protestant loyalists  
and the intransigent cul-de-sacs into which history has manoeuvred  
them.163 
 
Meanwhile, in a review of a biography on Archbishop Makarios the Times wrote: “From 
an Irish point of view, the fascination of the book, and of the Cyprus problem itself, is the 
attempt to resolve a majority-minority situation, where the two sides have historically 
held totally incompatible aspirations.”164  For the Irish, Cyprus’s issues seemed to 
confirm their fears that institutionalized power sharing could never work in Ireland. 
In reports on Cypriot independence, reporters mentioned frequently the shared 
complicated relationship with Great Britain.  And, as the years went on (and certainly by 
the time of the Turkish invasion), Irish journalists grew increasingly conscious of the 
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possibility that the Mediterranean island might also be partitioned.165  Their response was 
overwhelmingly negative.  The Irish Times expressed it mildly in a January 1960 article: 
“As this country [Ireland] knows full well, the drawing of a boundary almost always 
leads to trouble.”166  The Independent was more blunt: partition was “‘a last resort – and 
even that would not hold.’”167  While both papers certainly addressed the issue, the Irish 
Independent’s coverage was more comprehensive and detailed.  For that reason, this 
section will focus on that paper’s observations; I will, though, point out areas where 
differences between the newspapers appear.   
The Independent’s articles illustrate two important issues: Irish sentiment towards 
participation in UNFICYP, and perception of the Cypriots as fellow sufferers.  Following 
Kanli Noel in December 1963, the United Nations (UN) approached Ireland’s 
government about providing troops for a joint peacekeeping force on Cyprus.  Both 
papers reported a general unwillingness to do so.  This might come as a surprise, for it 
seems only natural that Ireland would wish to intervene and stop partition from becoming 
a reality elsewhere.  However, fear of partition was exactly what made the Irish hesitate.  
In March 1964, the Independent reported that one of the biggest worries of the 
government in deciding to send troops to Cyprus “is the danger that partition might be 
resorted to as a solution to the Cyprus problem. It is felt that Irish troops could not, in 
present circumstances, be associated with partition anywhere.”168  The government’s 
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qualms were also the result of financial concerns.  However, its reluctance is a serious 
concern.  As a divided country, it should have been first in line to participate in 
UNFICYP; that way, it could have worked closely with Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish 
officials to ensure that partition would never happen.  Instead, it stayed on the sidelines 
until the last possible moment.  Its hesitation is, in one sense, a terrible reflection on the 
Irish.  However, it also reveals the harmful (and paralytic) effects of partition.  The 
Independent reported the public’s unease with UNFICYP; this suggests that old 
grievances continued to exist and old wounds remained open.  On Cyprus, partition has 
had a similar effect.  Today, nearly forty years later, a displaced Turkish Cypriot claims 
feelings of “melancholy” when he sees his old home.169  Another said, “I’m just not 
drawn to the village anymore. It’s a really different feeling, and I probably don’t want to 
go because it will upset me.”170  Cypriot officials today would likely have the same 
reaction to a request to participate in a UN peacekeeping force to a country in danger of 
partition, and for the same reasons: financial, and fear of watching another society divide. 
 Following Turkey’s intervention in 1974, the Independent exploded with articles 
that connected the two islands.  Most noteworthy were those that discussed Archbishop 
Makarios, for the president himself did a commendable job connecting the Irish and 
Cypriot plights.  Journalists often then continued in this vein, simultaneously lamenting 
the inflamed Cypriot situation and the intransigent Irish one.  Soon before the invasion 
the paper published the following interview with the Archbishop: 
I asked President Makarios if it could not be possible to arrive  
at the stage where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would  
look on themselves primarily as Cypriots and join together for  
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the welfare of their lovely island and, at the same time, retain  
their legitimate cultural ties with the civilisations that moulded  
them. He agreed, wistfully, that that would be the ideal solution,  
but he said, with great sadness that he saw no hope of it happening.  
The Irish problem, he added, would be easier to solve. His thinking  
was nothing if not realistic, and if one applies the same question  
to Ireland, one can see why. Is it possible here to reach the stage  
where republicans and loyalists would look on themselves primarily  
as Irish and join together for the welfare of our island and, at  
the same time, retain legitimate ties with those influences which  
have fashioned their allegiances. That, too, would be the ideal  
solution. But is it possible?171  
 
This excerpt also illustrates a keen Irish understanding of the problems with partition.  
Both the journalist and Archbishop Makarios recognize that a key step to unification and 
peace would be the dissolution of sharp ethnic differentiations in favor of a unified 
national identity.  Indeed, an article ten years earlier pointed to the 1960 constitution’s 
failure to do this as a key reason for the outbreak of December violence.172  A political 
cartoon from August 1974 – when it was almost certain that the island would be 
partitioned – offers a break from the serious reporting that surrounds it.  In it, the island 
of Cyprus decides to ask Ireland for advice on how to handle division; if these two 
partitioned countries cannot find a solution, then Cyprus will go to Great Britain.  After 
all, she has more experience in the area. 
On the surface, this cartoon suggests that the Independent can poke fun at 
Ireland’s partition.  Yet, it is clear that it continues to harbor resentment on the subject.  
Moreover, the cartoonist suggests that partition binds countries together into a clique.  
The Independent’s reports on Cyprus go beyond simple factual analysis; they illustrate a 
feeling of camaraderie and sympathy for Cypriot division. 
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Reporters’ views of the situation 
Most of this chapter has focused on trends in writing, particularly subject-wise.  
In this third and final section, though, I address attitudes as expressed through the 
articles.  This will, I believe, provide a more complete understanding of the complex 
relationship the Irish public had with Cypriot politicians and citizens.  The attitude of the 
Irish Times – which was lukewarm with regards to the Cypriots’ plight – shifts noticeably 
when looked at from this perspective.  In contrast, the Irish Independent continues with 
its positive reporting of the island and sympathy with its inhabitants.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the Independent frames its articles in a very unique way.  Also of interest is 
the 1964 appearance in each paper of the story of Solomon.  In the Irish Times this took 
the form of a letter from a disgruntled Greek Cypriot named Frixos Joannides:  
Why must [the Greek Cypriots] be uprooted from the soil  
on which they have lived for literally thousands of years and  
which is soaked with their sweat and blood in order to make  
room for others? Why must Solomon’s sword come down  
on a living organism which has proved in the course of its  
long history that it is capable of achievements not only for itself  
but also for the world at large?173  
 
In the same year, an article in the Independent claimed that an Australian had been 
selected for the “‘Solomon’ task” of heading Cyprus’s Supreme Constitutional Court.174  
This article focuses on the new appointee’s predecessor, but the reference to Solomon is 
telling.  The story of Solomon is frequently used to illustrate the power of innovative 
thinking, as well as the value of maternal love.  However, it carries with it an important 
additional meaning: permanent separation.  Nearly ten years before Cyprus was actually 
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partitioned, then, onlookers from a different continent saw in the island’s future a 
biblically difficult decision between union and division. 
To a great extent, the Irish Times trivialized the Cypriot ordeal.  A 1959 article 
about the London-Zurich Agreements stated that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were 
“natural enemies,” and that “family quarrels are always the hardest to resolve.”175 This 
perception of the Cyprus disagreement persisted following Kanli Noel.  By reducing the 
issue to something as simple as “ancient tensions,” the paper helped perpetuate the 
fallacious notion that Greek and Turkish Cypriots are inherently at odds with each other.  
It is an especially interesting approach, though, given Ireland’s history of religious 
violence; it is unlikely that the Times would appreciate similarly generalized reporting of 
its own country’s history. 
At the same time, the paper consistently argued that the 1960 constitution led to 
the 1964 outbreak of violence.  Indeed, the Times repeatedly blamed ethnic violence on 
the misguided politics.  In January 1964, it published the following: “[The Constitution] 
piled guarantee upon guarantee to the extent that the edifice was bound to keel over, 
leaving the two communities as far apart from each other as they had been in the first 
place.”176 Following the invasion, the Times also argued that national identity is 
expressed best through political institutions.  This belief in the power of politics could 
provide a clue as to why it trivialized the Cypriot crisis by framing it ethnically: in doing 
so, the newspaper contextualized the conflict for its readers.  For the Times, ethnic 
violence was the powder keg; political impotence was the spark. 
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The Irish Independent, by contrast, had a more sentimental view of the situation.  
It also, interestingly enough, provided readers with a great deal of information about 
Archbishop Makarios, UN Secretary General U Thant, and the island itself.  The paper’s 
decision to take this tactic reflects its belief that readers had little understanding of 
Mediterranean and international politics.  In March 1964, the paper placed a regional map 
of Cyprus on the front page, with an accompanying arrow to identify the island’s specific 
location.177  A two-part feature piece on U Thant during that same month implies a 
curiosity about the UN and its leader.  Moreover, its timing (during the formation of 
UNFICYP) suggests that the public had been receiving a great deal of information about 
the peacekeeping force, yet lacked a clear understanding of its greater implications or the 
daily duties of its overseer.  The Independent used its coverage of the Cyprus conflict to 
combat this ignorance, and frequently brought in comparisons with Ireland.  It compared 
the size of Cyprus to that of “the counties of Cork and Kerry put together,”178 and 
referred to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as “Orthodox” and “Moslems,” 
respectively.179  Similar religious undertones are present in several other articles, for this 
was the type of identification that resonated with the Independent’s readership.  Indeed, 
the paper’s affinity for Archbishop Makarios likely stemmed from his religious devotion, 
which the Irish would see as comfortable and familiar. 
The Independent’s positive impression of the island persisted through the 
decades.  It is often written into articles in a lamenting tone, as if the paper has a personal 
interest in preserving Cypriot peace:  
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[Cyprus] is so abundant in Nature’s gifts, so full of sunshine,  
so rich in the dazzling remnants of an ancient civilisation, so  
unspoiled by the excesses of modern commerce, so friendly in  
its people, so equipped to release the unhappiness and tension  
that afflicts the human race. It could be a veritable paradise, and  
all that stands between it and this supreme felicity is the folly of  
man.180  
 
This sentimentality suggests that the paper’s publishers (and readers) had an emotional 
attachment to the island.  The Times, by contrast, had what could be deemed a practical 
attachment.  As Prime Minister Eden had done, the Times tied the Cyprus problem to 
ethnicity, and thus attempted to diminish its importance.  When the 1974 war began, the 
Independent attempted to analyze the mindsets of frustrated Greek Cypriots, suggesting 
that it viewed many on the island as comrades in the same battle.  “Part of the 
fury…stems from their feeling of futility in the face of events. They, the majority, have 
been deprived of part of the island…and no one seems to want to help.”181  The 
Independent’s considerate and respectful reporting is a departure from the factual, 
political, and generalized Times articles.  Reasons for these differences are numerous, but 
they boil down to one: the writers have different agendas.  The Times, a historically 
unionist paper, would seek to quell the significance of the Cypriot conflict, and relegate 
the inter communal tensions to “ancient” tensions.  In doing this, it could distance the two 
conflicts and stifle the resurgence of Irish memories of partition.  In contrast, the 
Independent was historically Irish nationalist: its authors recognized the similarities of 
Cypriot and Irish inter communal violence, and wished to elevate the comparison.  Doing 
so might raise awareness in Ireland of the island’s continued division; doing so could 
perhaps bring about change. 
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Conclusions 
By comparing both newspapers, it has been possible to highlight the long lasting, 
although not always immediately evident, effects of partition.  Analysis of foreign 
commentary offers a unique lens through which to view a regional conflict: Irish 
reporters had opinions on Cyprus, but they also implanted their own national remorse 
onto the Mediterranean island’s problem.  Many consider the “Cyprus problem” to be a 
frozen and forgotten conflict; in doing so, they downgrade the long-term effects of 
partition.  By looking at partition through the eyes of the Irish, I illustrate the camaraderie 
that emerges when two countries undergo this experience.  It is something citizens of a 
non-divided country would have difficulty comprehending.  By the time Cyprus 
underwent its first post-independence bout of inter communal violence, Ireland had been 
divided for nearly half a century.  Many of its reporters had been alive at the time, and 
were able to bring sophistication and understanding to their articles.  By studying two 
politically opposite newspapers, I illustrate that, despite their differences, Irish reporters 
were often painfully aware of the process of partition. 
The Irish Times and Irish Independent reports on Cyprus varied in depth, angle, 
and compassion.  The Times presented dispassionate and practical analyses of the 
situation, but the Independent went overboard to encourage readers to understand the 
conflict on a personal level.  In this case, the Independent likely did so to remind readers 
that inter communal violence is a deeply personal issue, one that cannot be relegated to 
simply facts or statistics.  Yet, noteworthy similarities outweigh these differences.  Each 
paper criticized British policy towards Cyprus, particularly with regards to the 1960 
treaties of independence.  Following Kanli Noel, mentions of British blame slowly 
disappeared as partition took center stage.  Both papers immediately recognized the 
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similarities between Cyprus and Ireland (the Times did so in a pre-independence, 1959 
article182) and both quickly moved to denounce any suggestion of partition in the 
Mediterranean. 
Nearly a half century following Irish partition, it is still possible to trace 
resentment between the lines of each newspaper.  Their motives may be different, but this 
is certain.  In Ireland, partition was used as a “‘problem-solving’ device adopted in an 
attempt to meet the claims of conflicting political aspirations.”183  Resentment lingered 
and colored sentiments during the Cyprus crisis.  In Cyprus, unlike in Ireland, partition 
was imposed from the outside.  This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the invasion; 
Cypriots’ memories, like the Irish, remain tainted with anger and frustration.  Both 
situations illustrate the futility of long-term partition.  Permanent separation – particularly 
in a society like Cyprus, where ancestral land holds great significance184 – fails to get at 
the root of the problem.  The result is continued tainted political opinions and bitterness. 
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Conclusion 
 
For the past two thousand years, external interference has been the go-to foreign 
policy.  Interference means involvement, involvement means a seat at the table, a seat at 
the table means power.  The colonial era offers perhaps the best illustration of this 
concept, for outside powers grafted themselves onto a foreign region’s domestic political 
and cultural life.  In the twentieth century, this type of policy remained but it became 
slightly more conniving.  After the Second World War, the Marshall Plan simultaneously 
revived and Americanized European economies.  Without overtly colonizing, the United 
States spread its influence to the far corners of the world.  In the more recent past, 
interference has taken the form of a non-state actor: the presence of the United Nations in 
Bosnia during the last years of the twentieth century, for example.  It can also be a force 
for humanitarianism: in the wake of reports that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used 
chemical weapons on his own people, many in the international community began 
pressuring their governments to intervene in the civil war.  For the purposes of this 
project, though, intervention is a harmful policy that detracts from autonomy and inhibits 
economic and cultural development.   
The English have spent the past five centuries on Ireland trying to capture, 
control, and confine it.  When the island was partitioned in the 1920s, many thought the 
struggle had come to a close.  But, centuries of English domination meant that there were 
pockets of English loyalists who continued to live in Ireland.  In the subsequent decades, 
then, conflict erupted between English loyalists and Irish nationalists in the north of 
Ireland.  In Cyprus, foreign rule has been the way of life for nearly two millennia.  
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Venetians, Egyptians, Ottomans, Romans, English.  They all wanted Cyprus.  Its neat 
placement in the eastern corner of the Mediterranean meant that whoever controlled it 
controlled sea access between Europe and the Middle East.  In 1960, the Cypriot 
constitution heralded the end of colonialism and the creation of something new.  It 
legitimized intervention by, not one and not two, but three foreign powers.  The Greeks 
and Turks now had just as much a right to intervene in Cyprus as did the English.  
Greece’s coup and Turkey’s invasion in 1974, though, revealed almost comically how 
terribly misguided the constitution had been.  International interference can have positive 
results, but in the long run it degrades local authority, which can have disastrous 
implications on nationalism, and economic and cultural traditions. 
In the most theoretical part of this project I discussed how a country divides.  
Social scientists such as Robert Schaeffer have noticed two trends: former British 
colonies split according to ethnic divisions, and Cold War states split according to 
political divisions.  This is overwhelmingly true, but we must be careful when discussing 
partitions.  There is an unavoidable tendency to mention ethnic divisions in the same 
breath as intractable, ancient, and unpreventable differences.  The idea that people cannot 
live together because of religious or ethnic variations is an old one, but it is one that I 
wanted to explore in the context of Ireland and Cyprus.  As the Irish narrative goes, 
Catholics and Protestants cannot stand each other.  But, this is not the product of inherent 
hatred.  It is, rather, the product of foreign (British) involvement, and continuing 
displacement and segregation.  In an attempt to make Ireland a Protestant stronghold, 
English monarchs encouraged and forced migration to their western neighbor.  The 
Protestants chafed under the restrictive relationship with their English kings and queens, 
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but they acquiesced.  Over the years, they began to represent the oppressor to the 
Catholic oppressed.  Political tensions such as these affected relationships on the tiny 
island, and tainted inter communal friendships until the present-day.  In Cyprus, the 
situation is remarkably similar.  Since Ottoman Muslims arrived on the island in 1571, 
policies by foreign rulers kept them separate from the native Greek community.  
Following inter communal violence in 1963, Turkish Cypriot leaders (with Turkish 
support) formed enclaves to protect their people.  In both countries, it has been foreign 
powers that have discouraged local unity.  This has meant they have a seat at the table for 
inter communal talks.  And, as we know, a seat at the table means power. 
I wrote earlier that partition is, at its heart, a local matter.  This becomes 
overwhelmingly and painfully apparent when reading the stories of those who have been 
displaced.  Reports by Turkish Cypriots who, returning to their homes after forty years, 
found nothing but dirt; memories of Greek Cypriots who visited their old homes in the 
north and found them in disrepair.  External actors will come and go, their motives will 
shift suspiciously, but the local population has an unshakable memory.  Partition disrupts 
the local order.  In both Ireland and Cyprus, one’s identity is heavily associated with 
one’s land; property is personal.  The forced migration that follows partition, then, 
devastates morale.  There is also the fact that newly constructed borders enforce and 
maintain both partition and migration.  For many Irish and Cypriots, borders serve as 
both visible and invisible symbols of partition.  They form a physical and mental barrier 
to reconciliation. 
In kindergarten classes, teachers punish students for fighting by placing them in 
opposite corners.  In a sense, partition is grounded in the same theory: temporary division 
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for permanent stability.  But, it rarely works out that way.  In the past hundred years, 
Germany, India, Palestine, Cyprus, Ireland, and more have been divided.  Of these, few 
have been reunited.  For the others, frequent flare-ups or frozen dialogue has been their 
punishment.  And yet, people continue to discuss partition as though it is a viable option.  
Media and political commentators heighten ethnic rivalry and portray it as ancient and 
unfixable.  Foreign actors continue to insert themselves into domestic conflicts, negating 
any purported respect for sovereignty, autonomy, and the will of the people.  Partition 
does not work.  It cannot work as long as its basic premise is the political, cultural, and 
economic separation of two communities.  Partition wrenches communities apart and 
heightens inter communal tensions; politicians and diplomats must stop using it as the 
fail-safe option to ending strife.  It will never succeed.
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